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Articles
Constitutional Economics
Luke Norris*
The conventional narrative that courts and legal scholars tell about the
repudiation of Lochnerism in the late 1930s is incomplete. The standard
view is that the Lochner line of cases'-those overturning state wage and
hour laws under substantive due process doctrine 2 -collapsed as their
premises about economic liberty were undermined. 3 The doctrine then
remained dormant until it was revived in Griswold v. Connecticut.4 The
account continues that the aim of substantive due process jurisprudence in
the post-Griswold era, as the Supreme Court turned to vindicating personal
and intimate rights under the doctrine, has been to distinguish the modem
doctrine from Lochnerism. 5 Yet this view ignores how the architects of the
New Deal era repudiated Lochnerism and how their affirmative
constitutional argument connects to modem substantive due process
doctrine.6
The conventional account is not incorrect, but it is incomplete. The
* Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School. For generous feedback and input, I thank Bruce
Ackerman, Guido Calabresi, Adam D. Chandler, R. Michael Fischl, Owen Fiss, Heather Gerken, Kent
Greenawalt, Jamal Greene, Claudia Haupt, Jeremy Kessler, Justin Lo, Henry Monaghan, Allison Tait,
and participants in the Associates & Fellows workshop at Columbia Law School. I also thank Mark
Pinkert and all of the editors for their excellent work and helpful contributions.
1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Jamal Greene shows that for much of the 20th
century, Lochner "itself was no more significant within the judicial imagination than were other cases
standing for similarly discredited notions of substantive review of social and economic legislation."
Jamal Greene, TheAnticanon, 125 HARv. L. REV. 379,447 (2011). In the late 1960s, however, Lochner
"became a useful foil to Griswold v. Connecticut and its substantive due process progeny." Id. With
this in mind, I refer generally to "Lochnerism."
2. Under the doctrine, courts read the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses to
offer a "substantive guarantee of liberty." U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No
State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "); Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 779 (2011).
3. See infra Part L.A for an overview of the conventional view of the repudiation of Lochnerism.
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. My references to Lochnerism are confined to Lochnerism within substantive due process
doctrine and its demise there. There is a separate literature on how the logic of Lochnerism has been
transported into First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 873, 883-85 (1987); Howard Wasserman, Bartnicki As Lochner: Some Thoughts on First
Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N KY. L. REV. 421 (2006).
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conventional account is correct that Lochnerism was undermined on its own
terms. The Court, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, in upholding a
Washington State wage and hour law, came to view the relationship
between employers and employees as one evincing unequal bargaining
power more so than willful freedom of contract?7 It therefore concluded that
the law did not interfere with the liberty protected by substantive due
process doctrine, undermining the Lochnerian view of liberty of contract
premised on employer-employee parity. The conventional narrative misses,
however, how the nation came to accept an alternative and affirmative view
of economic liberty focused on worker association. The architects of the
New Deal order were not satisfied merely to challenge the contractarian
model underlying Lochnerism. They argued that just as the political
freedom at the center of our constitutional order was defined by associative
participation in self-government, 8 so too was economic freedom in an
industrial order defined by associative participation in worker self-
government in labor unions. The history of the repudiation of Lochnerism
therefore becomes a story about the adoption of a view of economic liberty
based on mutual association.
My first endeavor in this Article is to explore more fully the repudiation
of Lochnerism. I focus in Part I on the conventional narrative about
Lochnerism and its decline, and characterize the forms of constitutional
reasoning and ethical argument related to it. I then flesh out at a high level
the ethical and purposive constitutional argument underlying the challenge
to Lochnerism. 9 I turn in Part II to the history of the development of the
counter-narrative supporting this argument, exploring how it was elaborated
by the labor movement-and in particular, the American Federation of
Labor ("AFL") and its leaders-and how leaders within the three branches
of the federal government adopted this competing argument about worker
freedom. 10 I trace the narrative about economic freedom from the labor
7. 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also infra Part lI.B.
8. See infra Part ll.B.
9. Other scholars refer to a series of related arguments, spanning from Jacksonian democracy
through the New Deal, about republican self-government as structural arguments. Joseph Fishkin &
William Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 BOSTON U. L. REV. 671, 686-87 (2014). This
characterization may be correct, since they are addressing the issue of oligarchy in their broad study,
which seems to be more directly related to the relationship between government and citizens that is
included within structural argument. See CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17 (2000). But since structural arguments, as I see them, are generally about the
interaction between governmental structures themselves and those structures and citizens, and since
ethical and purposive arguments are about the meaning and purpose of fundamental commitments-
including the scope of republicanism's requirement that citizens possess the independence and agency
that qualifies them for self-goveming-I prefer the use of ethical and purposive as labels for the types
of constitutional arguments that I am presenting in this Article.
10. Labor law scholars have written rich histories of the movement's arguments about inequality
and freedom, and the movement's' constitutional arguments sounding in the First, Fourteenth, and even
Thirteenth Amendments. See, e.g., infra note 67. Some of those histories reference the freedom of
contract jurisprudence in the courts and Lochnerism. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy
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movement through Congress as it passed the National Labor Relations Act
of 1935 ("NLRA"), I1 which provided workers with collective bargaining
rights; through the Executive as FDR campaigned for reelection in 1936;
and into the Supreme Court as it upheld the NLRA in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Company.12
As the Article shows, the two competing narratives are animated by
differences in approach to constitutional political economy. 1 3 On one side,
the forces behind Lochnerism focused on having courts strike down wage
and hour laws in the battle to define economic liberty. Such laws, they
argued, deprived workers and employers of liberty of contract and violated
substantive due process doctrine. On the other side, the labor movement and
congressional and executive leaders were focused on protecting worker
association through legislation and viewed worker freedom of association
as the paradigm of economic liberty protected by the Constitution. 14
To redefine economic liberty, these New Deal architects were mainly
focused on a particular kind of worker legislation. Significant parts of the
labor movement had a complicated relationship with wage and hour laws
like those overturned under Lochnerism, for fear that if enacted they would
set wage floors and ceilings, 5 and, although the most powerful forces
within the labor movement ultimately supported wage and hour laws, the
labor movement was most keenly focused on protecting worker association.
By the time of the New Deal, the movement and leaders in Congress and
the Executive were determined to prevail in the struggle to define economic
liberty by building out the national government to enact collective
bargaining guarantees that provided for worker freedom of association.
They pursued the route of building out the state through legislation that
sought to achieve constitutional purposes-what one scholar has called
of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1445-48
(1993); William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L. J. 165, 196-98 (2001).
This Article both builds on their work and ties labor's argument more strongly to the decline of
Lochnerism and the rise of post-Griswold substantive due process.
11. See Pub. L. No. 64-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1936) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151-169).
12. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Many studies of the constitutional significance of the New Deal take this
approach of looking beyond the courts alone. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1993) (assessing Congress and the Executive, in addition to the Supreme Court, in their
leadership roles in transformation); CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004) (assessing the role of Congress and the
Executive in creating constitutive commitments). It is also an approach taken by many scholars. See,
e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-30 (1998); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L. J. 1943, 2023 (2003).
13. See Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 9, at 671 ("arguments about constitutional political economy
begin from the premises that economics and politics are inextricable, and that our constitutional order
rests on a political-economic order").
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ").
15. See, e.g., FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 257-58 (1946); WILLIAM E. FORBATH,
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 17,55 (1991).
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"constitutional construction"-and ultimately prevailed in doing so. 16 The
fall of Lochnerism's constitutional vision of economic liberty therefore
coincided with the rise of labor's.
After unpacking labor's constitutional argument and presenting a fuller
account of the repudiation of Lochnerism, I turn to analyzing its
significance for modem doctrine. As I explore in Part III, the story of the
fall of Lochnerism would be importantly linked to aspects of the story of
the rise of post-Griswold substantive due process. Both are in part
constitutional transformations where forms of association that are
conceived of as being "non-political" come to be viewed as exercises of
freedom worthy of constitutional protection.' 7 While worker association
was the paradigm during the New Deal in the economic sphere, intimate
association became the paradigm of associational freedom in the post-
Griswold era in the personal sphere.18 Thus, while the modem Supreme
Court may be running from the ghost of Lochnerism as it fashions its
substantive due process doctrine, its intimate association reasoning picks up
on forms of constitutional argument related to Lochnerism's demise.
To be sure, the post-Griswold doctrine provides a somewhat weaker
account of associational freedom than the New Deal variant. This is in part
because the post-Griswold substantive due process cases analyzed in this
Article have at least two strands, which are sometimes both operative in the
same opinion. One strand is a privacy strand, focused on individuals and
negative liberty-that is, freedom from government interference. Cases like
Roe v. Wade19 and Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v.
Casey,20 in part because they involve bodily control and integrity, sound
strongly in the right to be let alone, or in negative liberty. Cases like
Griswold and Obergefell, I argue, are more directly related to the New Deal
account of freedom because of their focus on how freedom is exercised in
"non-political" association. The liberty interest in Griswold and Obergefell,
that is, involves more than the negative conception of state non-interference.
Beyond intimate association, however, I argue that the logic animating
16. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3-6 (2011) (describing how constitutional
constructions, including New Deal statutes, build out the state in order to serve constitutional purposes).
17. Throughout the Article, I employ the distinction between "political" and "non-political" spheres
to refer to categorizations often employed by courts and scholars. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483
(noting that the Court has "protected forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary sense
but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members"); Aviam Soifer, Freedom of
Association: Indian Tribes, Workers, and Communal Ghosts, 48 MARYLAND L. REV. 350, 363 (1989)
(distinguishing between associations based on religious, political, and economic matters and subjects).
I do not take a position on the validity of the distinction but instead attempt to show how, maintaining
it, the New Deal constitutional transformation and strands of the modem substantive due process
transformation align.
18. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. - (2015), slip. op. at 14 (recognizing a right to
intimate association).
19. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
20. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
[Vol. 28:1
2016] Norris 5
the New Deal repudiation of Lochnerism played a limited but still important
role in other areas of post-Griswold substantive due process jurisprudence.
As I explore in Part IV.E, the lasting import of the New Deal transformation
was to undo a tradition of thinking of liberty in "private" spheres solely in
negative liberty terms. By disrupting the notion that spheres beyond the
"political" sphere would naturally become ordered to allow for individual
liberty, and by focusing instead on the economic sphere as a complex
domain of governance and organization, the era paved the way for
Americans to take account of the social and relational conditions of freedom
in other "non-political" spheres. And thus, even in the cases focused most
on privacy, which sound strongly in government non-interference, the Court
pivoted between speaking of negative liberty and positive liberty. These
cases therefore exhibit what I refer to as a mixed tradition. Thus, even the
post-Griswold cases that do not link freedom and association are in another
way connected to the New Deal transformation.
Indeed, the way that scholars reason about the post-Griswold
jurisprudence links it to the logic animating the New Deal transformation
that this Article presents. Some scholars have concluded, for example, that
in the post-Griswold cases, the Court defined intimate liberty in terms of a
"personal version of self-government. '21 Building on this, others have noted
that the Court thus turned to protecting positive liberty 22 and liberty in
domains of collective decision-making beyond the political sphere.23 As this
Article explores, these are the moves that New Dealers made with economic
liberty: analogizing labor association to political self-government and
emphasizing the positive and exercise-based aspects of freedom in social
contexts beyond the "political" sphere.
This Article therefore disrupts the understanding that a waning gap
separates the early-mid twentieth century and the post-Griswold era and
connects the two constitutional transformations. The way that the Supreme
Court misinterprets the history of the repudiation, however, obscures from
its view lessons from the early-mid twentieth century. Thus, while the Court
recognizes a right to intimate association, it does not understand how it, in
fact, continues a New Deal tradition and misses the opportunity to draw
from the New Deal reservoir of reasoning.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I explore the standard view
of the rise and fall of Lochnerism and outline the competing argument. In
Part II, I explore how the New Deal architects made this competing
argument about economic liberty and worker association and how this
21. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1939 (2004).
22. See Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MiCH. L. REV. 1447, 1452 (2004).
23. See Jane S. Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment's Democratic
Aspirations, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 733, 734 (2004).
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argument was adopted by leaders within the federal branches. At the end of
Part II, I explore how this account of economic liberty transformed
American constitutional thought about "private" liberty. In Part III, I argue
that the New Deal conception of freedom of association in the economic
sphere provides the foundations for the post-Griswold construction of
intimate association as an exercise of freedom.
The broader aim of this Article is thus to begin to trace the constitutional
history of how the recognition and protection of freedom has focused on
"non-political" forms of association. Reasoning from the image of political
liberty, Americans have conceived of multiple associations where important
decisions are made in mutual regard as ones where freedom is exercised,
and as ones worthy of constitutional protection. The Court's decision in
Obergefell signals that it is time to take account of the constitutional theory
linking freedom and association that has developed beyond the political
sphere.
I. TffE RISE AND FALL OF LOCHNERISM
In this Part, I present the standard account of the rise and fall of
Lochnerism in Section A. I explore both how Lochnerism is understood by
scholars and how they view it as being undermined as its own premises
collapsed. I provide an overview of the account of economic liberty that
challenged Lochnerism in Section B in order to lay the foundations for
reasoning about how the history involves not only the collapse of
Lochnerism's premises but also the rise of another account of economic
liberty.
A. The Conventional View
Scholarly discussion of the transformation of economic liberty during the
early- to mid-twentieth century in constitutional scholarship and
jurisprudence in many instances begins and ends with substantive due
process. 24 According to the conventional account, the foundations "of
substantive due process lie in Lochnerism, which refers to the Court's
expansive interpretation of due process protections for property and
freedom of contract during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. ' 25 Thereafter, Lochnerism's logic collapsed in the crisis of the
New Deal, when "a face-off between the Executive and the Court in the
24. As I noted above, there are important labor law exceptions that link the labor movement to the
critique of Lochnerism. Some of these exceptions contrast labor's argument with "freedom of contract"
arguments. See supra note 10; see also infra note 67. This Article builds on their work and ties it more
directly to post-Griswold substantive due process.
25. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HIARV. L. REV. 4, 86 n.391 (2003).
[Vol. 28:1
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1930s... resulted in a repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the
Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 26 Then, substantive due process was "revived after World
War II, reconstituted on the seemingly solid foundation of Griswold v.
Connecticut," but "it never lost the taint of its original connection to
Lochnerism. ' '27 Griswold marked the rebirth of substantive due process as
a doctrine ascendant in cases about personal and intimate life, rather than
economic ordering. 28
This is a common recantation of the foundations and evolution of the
battle to define economic liberty: first in Lochner, then in Lochner's demise.
No reference is made, however, to Lochner's constitutional competitor.
This Part identifies the ways in which the transformation of economic
liberty through early employment of substantive due process is understood
by scholars and the Supreme Court in order to build on that work.
1. Its Meaning
The central question in Lochner was whether New York State interfered
with the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment when it passed a
law limiting the hours that bakery employees could work. The Court
concluded that the legislation "interfere[d] with the right of contract
between the employer and employees" and held that this right was "part of
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. '29
Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C. followed in this tradition, and there
the Court held that to require the employers of adult women to satisfy
minimum wage standards violated the freedom of contract between
employer and employee. 30
Both cases were animated by a particular kind of constitutional
argument-ethical argument-which would also be used by those
challenging Lochnerism. According to Philip Bobbitt, ethical arguments are
a form of "constitutional argument whose force relies on a characterization
of American institutions and the role within them of the American
people. '31 The ethical principle of limited government, and therefore a
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. On the importance of Griswold, see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L. J. 453, 526 (1989); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 511, 511,543 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements
on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2142 (2002).
29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
30. 261 U.S. 525, 545-46 (1923).
31. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 94 (1982). While
Bobbitt focuses his initial analysis mainly on ethical arguments about limited government, he also
includes those involving the idea of self-government and "inferences from the nature of republican
government." Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEXAS. L. REV. 1869, 1937 (1994);
see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 64-82 (1991). I may employ this notion
2016]
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
theory of negative liberty, drove the argument: the government was not to
interfere with the liberty of contract, and the distributions it produced, in
this private sphere. 32 Lochner is thus often said, simply, to stand for laissez-
faire principles in American law-that is, for the proposition that courts,
and legislatures, should not interfere in market transactions. 33 However,
scholars of the era provide more subtle views of the case.
Robert Post places Lochner in a Taft Court era struggle to protect forms
of "everyday" market ordering and the forms of economic distribution they
produced against bureaucratic control. 34 He posits that the Taft Court's "use
of substantive due process appealed to the pieties of everyday, normal life
in order to resist the bureaucratic interventions authorized by [World War
I].'35 In other words, the Taft Court located freedom in everyday forms of
person-to-person, atomistic market exchange and viewed state attempts to
regulate such exchanges as impinging on that freedom. This was because
the Court hewed to what Owen Fiss refers to as a "social contract" tradition,
viewing social and economic ordering as inherently conducive to producing
personal liberty, and viewing the government's power as an artificial and
limited product of that social contract.3 6 Thus, Justice Stephen Field, who
contributed greatly to the Lochnerian understanding of liberty, viewed an
"economic society free from government intrusion" as one where the
"forces of economic change" industrialism had unleashed could continue
with "beneficial effect. '37 Employer-employee relations within the sphere
of work should be beyond the reach of government, lest it interfere with the
development of industrial progress. 38
At the same time, the Court "used the doctrine of 'property affected with
a public interest' to distinguish domains of social life that could
constitutionally be subject to pervasive forms of administrative regulation
more broadly than Bobbitt would, because as Balkin notes, beyond limiting government, government
may sometimes employ "the beneficial exercise" of its power in order to maintain "the public interest."
Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641,677 (2013).
32. See BOBBITT, supra note 31, at 230.
33. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755 (5th ed. 2005) (describing
scholars' "substantive" objection to Lochner as an instance of the Court having "attempted to vindicate,
as a matter of constitutional law, a laissez-faire conception of the role of government that could not be
sustained"); BENJAMtN TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAME TO THE
COURT (1942); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV 873 (1987).
34. Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78
B.U. L. REv. 1489, 1505-06 (1998).
35. Id. at 1494.
36. OWEN M. Fiss, THE TROUBLED BEGINNNGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, 158-59
(1993); see id. at 164 ("Individuals, it was assumed would justly order their economic and social
relationships through exchange; the state would be needed to enforce those bargains and create the
proper conditions of exchange.").
37. PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED
AGE 4 (1997).
38. See id.
[Vol. 28:1
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from those domains of 'ordinary' life which could not. '39 Taft's discussion
of property affected with a public interest therefore began with the premise
that the arrangements of the new industrial order embodied freedom as a
general rule, making government restraint an exception, then proceeded to
explore the exceptions that could justify a "change from the status of private
business and its freedom from regulation into one in which the public have
come to have an interest. '40 That is, Lochnerism stood for the proposition
that freedom was embodied in the exchanges between employees and
employers. The ethical norm of limited government meant that the state's
power to regulate could only enter when the public had an interest, arising
through the state's police power4' or because the legislation related to a
legitimate national interest, such as developing utilities. 42
These accounts provide an understanding of what Lochner meant, and the
type of freedom it protected, only offering exceptions against the states'
police power to regulate that freedom. But the case and theory undergirding
it were not uncontested. This is an insight that Victoria Nourse explores.
Nourse argues that a central reason for the Court's decision in Lochner was
that it viewed the New York law limiting the hours bakery workers could
work as a labor law "masquerading as a health law, and thus outside the
accepted categories [of constitutionally allowable legislation] of safety,
health, and welfare. '43 As Nourse sees it, Lochner was embedded in a
narrative of early twentieth-century resistance both to worker organization
and to worker-protection laws. She sets up a Lochner-labor movement
struggle by posing against Lochner a form of popular constitutionalism, in
which figures such as Teddy Roosevelt argued that the law should allow for
forms of labor and worker legislation that protect various forms of "social"
versus "individualistic" security.44 However, she also asserts that these were
39. Post, supra note 34, at 1494.
40. Id. at 1517.
41. Victoria Nourse connects the public interest exceptions to police power. She sees Lochner as
not being about "the scope of the right to contract, or even whether the right triggered a particular kind
of scrutiny, but whether the state had the police power to regulate the right. If a regulation were within
the police power, the case ended." Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of
Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751,762 (2009). Lochner
was, under this account, not about a language of rights, which "were held by the people prior to, and not
depend[ent upon], textual limitation." Id. The case, instead, was located in a conversation about the
limits of state police power. Nourse's account syncs with Post's when one recognizes that when property
was affected with a public interest, the state had the police power to intervene in the market arrangements
that were said to embody substantive liberty.
42. Mary Cornelia Porter argues that courts used 'public interest"' doctrines to intervene into some
contractual spaces-including and especially the development of public utilities, which were important
to national development-but not into others. Mary Cornelia Porter, Lochner and Company:
Revisionism Revisited, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 12 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989).
43. Nourse, supra note 41, at 768.
44. Id. at 777.
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"not doctrinal claim[s] made by professional lawyers. '45 Thus, when
Roosevelt launched an attack on the Supreme Court and its protection of
"'property' rights rather than 'human' rights,"' he argued not from doctrine,
but instead from a normative political vantage that the courts were ignoring
the welfare of the public.46 The critique of Lochner was therefore political
at first but also came to constitute the legal understanding as Lochner was
repudiated.47
Nourse shows how critique of Lochner was directed at, but not always
located within, courts, and she elucidates the relationship between the
Lochner decision and labor struggles. The endeavor I pursue in this Article
is to continue exploring how that struggle played beyond the Progressive
Era and into the New Deal. As I explain below, the architects of the New
Deal had a critique of the Lochnerian conception of freedom that was not
simply about human rights legislation, as was Roosevelt's, but was also
about outlining a competing constitutional argument about freedom itself.
Furthermore, I explore how this critique took institutional shape in
legislation as Lochnerism was repudiated.48
2. Its Repudiation
Scholars share an understanding that the premises about economic life
that undergirded Lochnerism were rejected, but their accounts tend to focus
on Lochnerism's flaws rather than on a competing constitutional argument.
As a precedential matter, the repudiation of Lochner is located most
frequently in West Coast Hotel Co v. Parrish, in which the Court upheld a
general minimum wage law in Washington State, overruling Adkins and
explicitly rejecting Lochner's conception of freedom.49 As I explain further
in Part II.D, the Court there reasoned that "[1]iberty in each of its phases has
its history and connotation" and explained how Lochner's conception of
liberty in the workplace failed to recognize the imbalance of power between
employer and employee, which undermined the liberty of the latter.50 The
case therefore, as the Supreme Court would later put it, "signaled the demise
of Lochner.' '51
But this is not all there is to the story. For the Lochner Court, the central
question was whether the police power of the state, which allowed the state
to intervene on matters affecting public interest, justified the kinds of
45. Id.
46. Id. at 779-780.
47. Id. at 792.
48. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 88-89 (2011) (describing how lawyers
translate movement claims into legal claims).
49. 300 U.S. 379, 390-400 (1937).
50. Id.at391.
51. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992).
[Vol. 28:1
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economic regulation at hand. The Court answered that it could not, because
the activity regulated was a form of liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and was beyond the state's plenary
power. West Coast Hotel proceeded from the same central question. It just
gave the opposite answer. That is, the Court concluded that, in light of
unequal bargaining positions and the "public interest in health.., and
protection" of the employee from the abuses that come from such power
imbalances,52 the wage legislation was a "reasonable exercise of the police
power of the state. '53
As a historical matter, scholars thus see the demise of Lochner in the
undermining of its premises about of freedom as existing inherently in
industrial revolution era economic life. The doctrine "collapsed with the
growing awareness that the impersonal kind of contractual 'self-
government' that great inequalities of wealth and bargaining power too
often generated was government of, by, and for the more powerful party-
a mockery, more than a model, of the democratic self-government to which
the ideal spoke. '54
There is an unanswered question, though: If the form of self-government
that Lochner embodied was a "mockery, more than a model" of democratic
self-government, was there a form of self-government that could be an
expression of freedom in the workplace? This is the question answered by
the New Deal.
B. Beyond the Conventional View
Lochnerism was part of a Progressive-era debate over the meaning of the
Constitution's guarantee of liberty in the economic sphere in a nation
composed largely of wage-earning workers. That debate came to a head in
the New Deal, when another argument about a form of economic liberty
that was deserving of constitutional protection came to the center of
American discourse. To move beyond the conventional narrative, I lay out
in this section the premises and arguments undergirding this side of the
debate.
1. A Balance Offset
One remarkable aspect of the conventional narrative is the extent to which
Lochnerism is premised on a notion of continuity rather than on a frank
52. Id. at 585.
53. Id. at 581.
54. Tribe, supra note 21, at 1939 (2004). Bruce Ackerman similarly sees Lochner's premises
transformed, in this case by a constitutional engagement between the Executive and the Court, where
FDR, proceeding under a model of presidential leadership, won the support of the American people for
the understanding that the national government could intervene into the economic sphere and assert an
activist, national state. See ACKERMAN, supra note 12, at 280-83.
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confrontation with just how much economic ordering had changed in the
nation after the Civil War. For the New Deal architects, the changes brought
by both the Industrial Revolution and the transition from an agrarian
republic to a system of wage-earning workers were constitutionally
significant. They undermined the conception of economic liberty upon
which our constitutional political economy was based, replacing a system
premised on independent agrarian entrepreneurs possessing liberty with one
where citizens were workers in enterprises without adequate or equal
bargaining power with their employers, such that the conditions of everyday
exchange embodied domination more so than liberty. Indeed, for the New
Deal architects, the conditions of economic life threatened to throw off the
entire constitutional system balance between economic and political liberty.
To understand how the New Deal architects came to adopt a competing,
affirmative view of economic liberty, one must first understand their
diagnosis of why and how economic liberty did not exist in the modern
workplace, and why this was an issue of constitutional proportions.
Since the Revolution, it had been "axiomatic" in American constitutional
thought that political freedom required economic freedom.55 Economic
freedom was thought to be achieved by granting wide access to property,
which was thought in turn to make possible a system of citizen-
entrepreneurs-then, white males-whose self-sufficiency would make
them the kinds of independent persons that citizenship in the republic
demanded. 56 This notion was not only linked to property enabling citizens
to become entrepreneurs or farmers, but also, and equally importantly, to
combating docility and domination in economic life that would bleed into
politics. 57 Economic liberty therefore supported and made possible political
liberty. The two were symbiotic.
For the labor movement, the concentration of employer power as the
nation moved from an agrarian system to an industrial system based on
wage-earning created the very webs of dependence that property was meant
to untangle. Thus, as the nation became "a country of hired men," this
notion of atomistic and self-sufficient citizen-entrepreneurs could not
55. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 9 (1996); see also ROBERT DAHL, A
PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 1 (1986) ("Within a generation or so after the Constitutional
Convention, a rough consensus appears to have been reached among Americans among white male
citizens, at any rate-that a well-ordered society would require at least three things: political equality,
political liberty, and economic liberty ....
56. See FONER, supra note 55, at 9.
57. See, e.g., GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 106 (1998) ("' If
virtue was based on liberty and independence,' then it followed that only autonomous individuals free
from any ties or interest and paid by no master were qualified to be citizens. Jefferson and many other
republican idealists hoped that all ordinary yeoman farmers who owned their own land and who
depended for subsistence only on 'their own soil and industry' and not 'on the casualties and caprice of
customers' would be independent and free enough of pecuniary temptations and marketplace interests
to be virtuous.").
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persist, if ever it could have before.58 The change, as Robert Dahl puts it,
was meaningful:
The older vision of a citizen body of free farmers among whom an
equality of resources seemed altogether possible, perhaps inevitable,
no longer fitted that reality of the new economic order in which
economic enterprises automatically generated inequalities among
citizens: in wealth, income, social standing, education, knowledge,
occupational prestige and authority, and many other resources. 59
The New Deal architects therefore argued that economic conditions-
where workers had little control over their hours and pay,60 where child
labor existed, 61 and where efforts of worker to associate to challenge the
conditions were thwarted 62-undermined the liberty of citizens. A salient
image of this was the mill village: a system where workers were sometimes
hired as families, worked incredibly long hours without adequate pay, and
lived on company grounds and often company credit.63 As William Forbath
puts it, the "increasing concentration of ownership of resources and capital"
had factory workers "competing against new machines and new unskilled
and underpaid workers," during a time that would "dispossess[] artisans and
new immigrants and their families [along with] millions of working-class
women and children into the factories. '64 The proprietors of these factories
"demand[ed] longer and longer hours of 'mindless toil,' that deprived
workingmen of the time to educate themselves and participate in public
affairs. '65 The system produced more "dependence, ignorance, and more
grinding poverty. '66 In this way, it disrupted the entire constitutional
political economy.
The notion that such a system could maintain economic independence
58. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW,
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, ch. 5 (1985) (describing how
journeymen and trade associations in the 1800s believed that worker combination was necessary in an
economy that defied the image of an agrarian republic and that these associations were the axis of
republican society).
59. DAHL, supra note 55, at 3.
60. See, e.g., LANDON R.Y. STORRS: CIVILIZING CAPITALISM: THE NATIONAL CONSUMERS'
LEAGUE, WOMEN'S ACTIVISM, AND LABOR STANDARDS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA ch. 1 (2000) (exploring
the fight for minimum wage and hour laws); GEORGE E. PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE FOR THE
FORGOTTEN MAN: THE QUEST FOR FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 1933-41, 16-34 (exploring workers'
difficulties in controlling wages and hours and in receiving legislative aid in doing so).
61. See, e.g., FLORENCE KELLEY, SOME ETHICAL GAINS THROUGH LEGISLATION ch. 1 (1910)
(exploring the phenomenon of child labor in the United States).
62. See, e.g., FELtx FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) (exploring
how courts used injunctions to impede workers from organizing).
63. See, e.g., IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER,
1920-1933, chs. I & 2 (1960) (exploring how in the years before the New Deal, workers were thwarted
from bargaining collectively and surveying the conditions in mill villages).
64. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1999).
65. Id. at 29.
66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and freedom rang false for the architects of the New Deal order. They
endeavored to challenge the arrangement and regulation of economic life in
America as it had evolved with industrialism, arguing that it was antithetical
to, rather than an embodiment of, liberty; that it created conditions of
industrial insecurity and worker incapacity under the guise of liberty and
equal contract rather than allowing worker association to flourish in a
manner that might give workers some agency over their hours, pay, and
conditions, thereby restoring to them the ability to be the types of persons
that constitutional citizenship demanded. 67 These actors thus asked how the
nation's central constitutional commitments could be employed to reshape
the economic sphere in order to maintain the constitutional balance between
political and economic liberty.68 As economic life increasingly looked like
a complex social domain where decision-making was made and where
domination was possible without coordination-more and more like
political self-government-these architects turned to political life for an
analogy.
2. The Argument
In order to make the case for a changed view of economic liberty for a
changed economic order, the New Deal architects made constitutional
claims against those associated with Lochnerism. They made two
complementary arguments that I briefly present at a general level in this
section before turning to the history of the development of those arguments
below. 69
67. For an overview of labor struggles during this transition, see generally FONER, supra note 55,
130-46 (1996) (tracing how the labor movement came to make freedom of association arguments about
worker organizing); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-
30,58-61 (1999) (overviewing labor's arguments from the First, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
about worker association and its arguments about industrial freedom rather than control); James Gray
Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L. J. 941, 962-966 (1997) (exploring how labor's
"constitution of freedom" posed worker association against industrial servitude); James Gray Pope, The
Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of the Post-New Deal
Constitutional Order, 1921 1950, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-25 (2002) (same); see also TOMLINS,
supra note 58, at 34-44 (explaining the labor movement's argument about unions as the axis of
republican society).
68. The move of reasoning from political liberty towards an account of economic liberty is not
novel. Theorists from Dewey to Dahl have argued that economic institutions should be congruent with
political ones. See DAHL, supra note 55 (arguing for the end of corporate capitalism and for the
beginning of collective capitalism, which would be more true to democratic values and requirements);
JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927) (arguing that democracy must be a way of life
that entails participation in the governance of all institutions of one's life). And theorists from
Tocqueville to Mill have argued that citizen association in private life can produce democratic practices.
See I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68 (Arthur Goldhammer ed. & trans., The
Library of America 2004) (1835) (arguing that associations and mediating groups of governance act as
schools of democracy); JOHN STUART MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF
THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (1848) (arguing that forms of workplace democracy
would allow workers to cultivate democratic capacities more broadly).
69. See infra Part ll.b.
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Like the constitutional argument associated with Lochnerism, labor's
argument was an ethical one. But it was an ethical argument based on the
meaning of self-government as national ethos rather than on limited
government. Labor argued that the nation's core constitutional commitment
to self-government mandated that the Constitution protect both political
liberty, which had been defined as associative participation in political self-
government, 70 and economic liberty, which labor and its allies defined as
associative participation in worker self-government in labor unions. 71
Indeed, they argued that worker self-government was not only consonant
with the nation's ethos but also was necessary for workers to become the
kinds of economically un-dominated people that citizenship in the republic
demanded. When workers formed in a union to deliberate on their shared
goals and ends, they engaged in a democratic act and expression of freedom
in everyday life. 72 Thus, for example, when the Senate Report for the NLRA
stated that "[a] worker in the field of industry, like a citizen in the field of
government," has "an inherent right" to "self-government," it was making
a claim about how the constitutional ethos of self-government structures not
70. As historian Eric Foner puts it, describing the early American conception of freedom, "Political
freedom for men meant the right to self-government, the power to consent to the individuals and political
arrangements that ruled over them." ERIC FONER, supra note 55, at xvi. Political liberty was
fundamentally defined by the "right to participate" in the community's "political self-determination. Id.
at xvii. Freedom was therefore "both an idea and a practice." Id. Similarly, Gordon Wood, in his
sweeping The Creation of the American Republic, contrasts "public or political liberty," which is the
"right of the people to share in the government" through participation in self-government with "personal
or private liberty," which spoke to the "protection of individual rights against all government
encroachment." GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 608-09 (1968). Alexis
de Tocqueville picks up on this notion of political freedom as something exercised by the community,
speaking of the "apprenticeship of freedom" and calling freedom a "noble exercise of the faculties of
man." TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 68, at 243. Philosopher Quentin Skinner explores a republican tradition
spanning back to Roman moral philosophy that "connects freedom with self-government," marking a
notion of political freedom that is distinct from, but also contributes to, "the enjoyment of personal
liberty." Quentin Skinner, The Paradoxes of Political Liberty, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 229 (McMurrin, S. M., ed., 1986). Skinner explains that political freedom is exercised in a
"community... in which the will of the citizens, the general will of the body-politic, chooses and
determines whatever ends are pursued by the community as a whole." Id. at 239.
71. See Richard Michael Fischl, 'Running the Government Like a Business': Wisconsin and the
Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 YALE L. J. ONLINE 39, 40 (2011) (discussing "the struggle
between democratic governance and authoritarian control in the American workplace"); see also Fishkin
& Forbath, supra note 9, at 690 ("Social and economic citizenship were simply inseparable from
political citizenship, and the government had 'inescapable obligations' to protect both.").
72. Unions are, admittedly, a weaker form of self-government than the purely political one at the
center of the constitutional order. Unions offer representation--through, for example, elections-but
lack other important political features such as equal protection and due process guarantees. See, e.g.,
CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION
28-29 (2010).
72. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, I WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 20 (1991). The AFL during the time
studied here did not take its claims to what could be conceived of as their logical end: an argument for
worker ownership of industry. This fact reflects, among other things, a compromise between property
law and corporate law as they had developed and a workable labor law. See FONER, supra note 55, at
135 (the rise of the AFL "reflected a shift toward the judgment that workers must frankly accept their
status as wage earners and seek higher wages and better working conditions" through collective
bargaining).
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only political but also economic ordering.73 One could also call it a
purposive argument because it drew on how the nation must act to effectuate
to fulfill the purposes of the constitutional system 74-that is, to make the
norm of self-government real in the lives of citizens who were now mostly
wage-earning workers. 75
The New Deal architects would at times make this strong claim that the
ethical commitment to self-government encompassed worker self-
government, and at other times, make a complementary but somewhat
weaker claim about constitutional inference. The move was to argue that it
would be incoherent to have a constitutional commitment to political self-
government yet impede workers from participating in economic self-
government. 76 Put another way, even if the political commitment did not
encompass the economic commitment, labor argued that it would be
incoherent and incongruous to protect political liberty defined as
participation in self-government and deny economic liberty defined as
participation in worker self-government. Indeed, the protection of worker
self-government was especially important in the industrial order where
worker association was critical to defining the governance regime at work
and, therefore, affected the daily freedom of citizens. 77
As I explore below, labor made these arguments at various points, though
ultimately they were made by labor, Congress, and FDR, who used them to
justify the growth a national regulatory regime to fulfill these constitutional
purposes. 78 Along the way, these actors would pierce the shield of negative
liberty that had defined the American commitment to freedom in spheres
beyond politics-and that was employed by the forces behind
Lochnerism-and redefine economic freedom around association. These
twin moves of reasoning beyond negative liberty in spheres beyond politics
and reasoning about liberty there in terms of association and exercise would,
73. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
74. Balkin offers an account of an argument from purpose-that is, "the purpose or principles
behind the Constitution"-and identifies "republicanism" and "self-government" as animating
purposes. Balkin, supra note 31, at 660.
75. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
76. See infra Part ll.b.
77. Just as the Founders had assumed an agrarian order and justified property rights in part because
they thought of economic independence as a precondition to republican constitutional self-government,
see infra Part Il.A., the AFL and its allies eventually assumed an industrial order and argued that labor
freedom was a precondition of republican constitutional self-government. For one, worker self-
government could protect workers from the abuses of industry such as low wages, intolerable conditions,
and domination in the mill village. Whereas, without protection against such abuses, workers would
become the very kind of docile and economically-dependent citizens incompatible with the ideal of
republican self-government. Thus, where property was the key to economic independence and freedom
at Founding, balancing property with worker self-government became the key during the New Deal era.
78. These were rights to be enacted and protected by government against actors in the private
sphere-a proposition supported in part by the fact that the institutions of private life had become so
powerful, interdependent, and complex that they might interfere with the functioning of republican self-
government. See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 10, at 176.
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contrary to the conventional narrative, be an intellectual precursor to the
connection of another form of "non-political" association with freedom in
the formulation of substantive due process jurisprudence later in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
II. A REAPPRAISAL: THE NEW DEAL TRANSFORMATION
This Part explores how the competing argument about economic liberty
was developed by the labor movement, was translated by Congress into
legislation, promoted by the Executive, and adopted by the Supreme Court.
The Part ends by drawing these disparate strands together and presenting an
account of how the New Deal architects both redefined economic liberty
around worker association in an affront to Lochnerism and struck a blow
against the old way of viewing liberty in private spheres solely in terms of
governmental non-interference.
A. Labor
This section explains how the AFL and its presidents drew out a
constitutional argument as they fought for union recognition and,
ultimately, legislative protection. This argument became clear just after the
turn of the century, when the AFL had consolidated its power, and found a
powerful leader in Samuel Gompers. Gompers presided over the AFL in the
years when unions were still struggling for recognition, often fighting courts
and hostile legislatures, and he delivered his message about liberty in
worker association---connecting political freedom in self-government to
worker freedom in union self-organization-with particular urgency.79 As I
explore below, Gompers began by connecting worker freedom to political
freedom in fits and starts before developing a stronger and more coherent
approach to reasoning about and arguing for economic liberty.
1. The Gompers era
In 1914, Gompers and the AFL were fighting against courts that stood in
the way of labor association by holding that combinations of workers
violated antitrust law. 80 He helped to shepherd in the Clayton Antitrust
79. My concern here is less on the AFL's aims at the time and more on its language. It should be
noted both that the labor movement was not focused on a national policy like the NLRA at the time
(although it would be later), and that this summary is hardly comprehensive of labor's argument. For
example, there is a rich history of the labor movement arguing for collective bargaining rights under the
13th Amendment, and of it resisting state assistance and legislative efforts. See e.g., Forbath, supra note
10, at 183-85; James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and
the Shaping of the Post-New Deal Constitutional Order, 1921-1950, 102 COLUM. L. REV. I (2002);
James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L. J. 941 (1997); see also CHRISTOPHER
L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985).
80. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 62.
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Act,81 which exempted unions from antitrust regulation on the theory that
the labor of a human being is not a commodity to be traded in commerce.
Along the way, Gompers strove to tie worker association not to
anticompetitive conduct, subject to antitrust law, but to the promise of self-
government implicit in the Constitution. For Gompers, self-government was
not merely confined to political association and political liberty but was
deeply related to the economic realm as well.
Gompers began to foreshadow the constitutional argument by connecting
political freedom to industrial conditions. At an AFL gathering in 1914,
Gompers said, "We profess to believe in democratic freedom yet
domination of power so ruthlessly prevails in industry. ' '82 The notion that
the relationships of industry, rather than embodying liberty, as the Taft
Court would have it, represented its opposite, provided an important
critique, and the connection of democratic freedom-typically conceived in
political terms-with the conditions of industry was an important hook. The
AFL convention met in Philadelphia in the same year and Gompers
continued to link union association to political liberty. Gompers stated that
Philadelphia was where "the charter of America's freedom and
independence was declared to the world. 83 The meeting in Philadelphia had
been a "development of the spirit of organized working people," a spirit that
was "in harmony with the Declaration of Independence" which gave to the
nation "a new concept of the rights of man."'84 Linking the two together,
Gompers declared that the "mission of the American Federation of Labor"
was to "translate these declarations into the everyday activities of the lives
of our people." 85
By 1919, so prevalent was the connection between the American ideal of
freedom and worker association that it took center stage in a collection of
Gompers's writing and speeches. In the introduction to Gompers's Labor
and the Common Welfare, Hayes Robbins, who wrote on labor issues, stated
that "self-government," the central ideal of the constitutional order, was not
only the central ideal of the AFL and labor movement, but that labor
association in unions was an exercise of "freedom, under self-control of
democracy" and that such a "power of self-control, right in the heart of the
labor problem itself, is what most re-assures those who see the future of
democracy as mainly an industrial issue. '86 Robbins thus argued that worker
81. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006).
82. Samuel Gompers, Editorial, AM. FEDERATIONIST, December 1914, at 1081.
83. Samuel Gompers, President, AFL, Address to the AFL Convention at Horticulture Hall,
Philadelphia, PA (November 9, 1914).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Hayes Robbins, Introduction to SAMUEL GOMPERS, LABOR AND THE COMMON WELFARE, at v
(1919).
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association was an exercise of freedom and self-government. Self-
government was not merely a fundamental ethic of the nation in politics; it
was one that regulated economic life.
In the volume, Gompers stated that it is the "liberty implied in the
fundamental principles of our Republic" that demanded that workers
associate in unions.87 At another point, Gompers asserted, "I take it, my
friends, that it would be part of wisdom if those who loved liberty most and
stood for the principles upon which the republic of our country is based,
would realize that in the labor movement of our time is vested the power
and the spirit to defend justice and to perpetuate free institutions. '88 The
struggle for worker self-government involved "the very essentials of free
institutions." 89 Gompers drew on the core purposes of the constitutional
system to make claims about economic governance. At other points,
Gompers claimed that those opposed to worker association in unions denied
workers the proper extension of the "fundamental principles of freedom."90
He stated that the "institutions of the United States represent a principle-
the great principle of self-government" that was realized by associations of
workers engaged in self-representation and self-organization. 91 Self-
government, then, was a constitutional super-norm---our constitutional
ethos-and as such it needed to extend from politics into the industrial
world.
The labor movement was not alone in making these arguments. Labor had
an ally in Louis D. Brandeis, whom President Wilson had nominated to the
Supreme Court in 1916 and who had through legal argument come to these
conclusions himself. Brandeis, as counsel for states trying to implement
workers' laws, wrote compelling amicus briefs including one in the well-
known Muller v. Oregon,92 a case involving limitations on the hours that
women could work. These were, as historian Eric Foner put it,
"revolutionary social and economic briefs. '93 And Brandeis wrote in
support of labor rights in both his roles as a citizen-lawyer and later as a
Supreme Court Justice. As Foner aptly summarizes, Brandeis "maintained
that unions embodied an essential principle of associational freedom-the
right of people to govern themselves. '94 Brandeis asserted that citizens
could not be "self-respecting members of a democracy" without "freedom
87. SAMUEL GOMPERS, LABOR AND THE COMMON WELFARE 60 (1919).
88. Id. at 157 (quoting Samuel Gompers, President, AFL, Address at Chicago, Ill., 1908).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 158.
91. Id. at 211 (quoting Samuel Gompers, President, AFL, Annual Report to AFL Convention,
Kansas City, December 1898).
92. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
93. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933, at
223 (1969).
94. FONER, supra note 55, at 142.
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in things industrial. '95 There could not coherently be "political liberty"
alongside "industrial slavery. '96 Thus one can see ethical and purposive
arguments alive in Brandeis's thought: the ethic of our constitution was one
of self-government, and self-government needed to extend from the
political to the economic; and the Constitution's purpose of effectuating
self-government was thwarted by denying workers freedom of association,
without which they could not become self-respecting members of a
democracy.
World War I provided the labor movement a platform to assert that
associations of workers engaged in self-organization embodied freedom.
The AFL produced and ratified a statement in response to both the War and
to the democratic struggles commenced by it. The union said that the War
had caused a "world-wide determination to overthrow and eradicate all
autocratic institutions, so that a full measure of freedom and justice can be
established." 9 The War "awakened more fully the consciousness that the
principles of democracy should regulate the relationship of men in all their
activities." 98 It signaled the need for "new conceptions of human liberty,
justice and opportunity... to be applied." 99 The AFL thus used the
experiences of the War to build an argument about how a new concept of
liberty should extend beyond the political, into "all of the activities of men,"
chief among them the associative activities of workers. 100 For the AFL, it
was as "inconceivable that workers as free citizens should remain under
autocratically made law within industry and commerce as it is that the
nation could remain a democracy while certain individuals or groups
exercise autocratic powers."'1 1 That is, they argued, it was inconceivable to
have a political conception of self-government as an expression of freedom
without extending it to the sphere of work, which was so central to the daily
lives of most Americans. Self-government, as our constitutional ethos,
needed to structure both realms.
2. Green and the New Deal
The Depression, and the advent of the New Deal, would provide a new
platform from which to make the argument about associative freedom in the
workplace, as well as new supporters.
William Green was now at the AFL's mast and the labor movement had
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. AFL, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 71 (1919).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. ld.at41.
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renewed energy with the election of FDR. During this time, Congress
passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (the "Recovery Act"),102 and,
two years later, the NLRA. The Recovery Act produced a system of sector-
based codes, under which industries would commit to both recognizing
unions and to norms about workplace conditions and contracts. The
Recovery Act, however, was a corporatist half-measure that would
ultimately fail to protect the right of workers to bargain collectively:
employers either ignored its collective bargaining guarantees or interpreted
the guarantees to allow the employers to create and direct their own
"company unions." Both courses of conduct, of course, sapped collective
bargaining of its power.10 3 The labor movement thus pushed for the NLRA,
which more firmly guaranteed workers the right to bargain collectively and
entrenched formalized procedures to ensure this right was protected.'1 4
Along the way, Green took up the conception of liberty that would challenge
the one adopted in Lochner with the same flourish as Gompers.
As the AFL moved toward supporting federal protection of the right to
bargain collectively, Green strove to center labor in both American political
life and democratic thought. On the heels of the passage of the Recovery
Act, he wrote to his movement that labor's struggles in association were "in
deciding matters that concern our living" that are "of fundamental
importance to each of us. °10 5 He then connected the struggle for worker
association to the American struggle for democracy. He spoke of the quest
for freedom and self-government during the Revolution, saying that
political self-government was "adequate to meet our needs" then, but as
"economic and social structure became more interdependent and
complicated," we found that political lawmaking "was only a small part of
government and affected only a limited group of decisions that affected our
daily living."106 He then made the argument that worker association in
industry could provide for that necessary self-governance. 107 As he put it at
another point, union association was the mechanism for "working out...
the principles of freedom and democracy in this new field of
102. Pub. L. 73-90, 48 Stat. 195, enacted June 16, 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 703. The AFL had
actually written and backed an hour and wage law, the Black Bill, in 1932, but FDR intervened and
pushed for the Recovery Act as a compromise measure. The AFL accepted the measure on the condition
that, among other things, section 7(a), which it had written, would be added to ensure worker collective
bargaining guarantees. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WORKER 1933-1941 24-30 (1969).
103. See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEw DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINtNG POLICY ch. 3
(1950).
104. See Forbath, supra note 10, for an exploration of how progressive labor leaders moved away
from 13th Amendment-based arguments in favor of labor protection and towards favoring a national
legislative enactment based on the Commerce Clause.
105. William Green, Editorial, AM. FEDERATIONIST, March 1933, at 231.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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government."'10 8 In these instances and more, Green was conceiving of
liberty as participation in self-government, and arguing that such liberty
ought to extend to workers as well as their associations too reflect an
economic form of self-government. 109 If self-government was the nation's
ethic, and if making it real in the lives of citizens was the Constitution's
purpose, then workers needed their rights of association to be protected.
Green and the AFL were hardly alone. In 1931, a member of the
Brotherhood of Railway clerks wrote, "Mere political independence was a
dead letter unless it was accompanied by industrial independence."' 10 This
was a purposive argument about constitutional political economy: the
political dimensions of self-government which are at the center of our
constitutional system are thwarted without allowing industrial freedom.
Intellectuals, too, joined in. Edward Devine wrote in his 1933 book,
Progressive Social Action, that where a constitutional system dedicated to
political democracy remained, "industrial democracy is certainly
conspicuous for its absence."' I One of the most coherent and
comprehensive academic treatments of this argument was taken up by
Professors Ordway Tead and Henry C. Metcalf in their book Labor
Relations under the Recovery Act, published in 1933. The passage of the
Recovery Act prompted their book, which sought to justify further the Act's
protection of collective bargaining rights. They argued that "[a]t bottom the
problem is one of the worker's relation to industry in a democratic country
where the principles of representative government are rightly held to be
fundamental to the preservation of all institutions which are to serve all the
people." 12 They thus argued that the constitutional norm of self-
108. William Green, Editorial, AM. FEDERATIONIST, March 1935, at 243.
109. At other times, the democratic feature of union organization was touted without explicit
reference to freedom. Continuing to link democratic freedom to worker self-government, in 1931, Green
wrote that the workplace was a "field of personal relations" in which "democratic practices must be
incorporated" by allowing for worker self-government. William Green, Editorial, AM. FEDERATIONIST,
November 1931, at 1331. In 1933, the American Federationist included an article by labor historian
George Douglas, which asserted that labor's "troubles do not arise from the failure of democracy, but
rather because democracy has never been accorded an honest opportunity to fully and properly
function." George Douglas, The Question, AM. FEDERATIONIST, January 1933, at 62. And so, the labor
movement should direct its attention toward democracy's "perfection" in the workplace. Id. The
movement represented the best hope for that perfection, because its ideals embodied "the practical
application of the spirit and principles of the democratic concept of social organization, economic as
well as political." Id. Douglas warned, "Our whole problem is that of putting the principles of
democracy into positive practice in our workday lives and affairs, and so long as we suffer defeat of this
latter purpose we [cannot] enjoy the full benefits of a true democracy." Id.
110. Henry F. Kirkham, Union Achievements, AM. FEDERATIONIST, August 1931, at 948.
111. EDWARD T. DEVINE, PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL ACTION 55-56 (1933). He continued that in
democratic societies "the important thing for [workers] is not the vote which they cast once a year at the
polls, but what happens to them in the places where they work. Id. at 56. There becomes for them a
sense of the "absurd disparity between their assumed importance as voters when a political campaign is
in progress and their helpless insignificance as members of the economic order." Id.
112. ORDWAY TEAD & HENRY C. METCALF, LABOR RELATIONS UNDER THE RECOVERY ACT 165
(1933). Later in the book, Tead and Metcalftook on the evolution of democracy and argued that a long
[Vol. 28:1
Norris
government in economic life was realized in worker association. Justifying
union organization, they asserted an "essential unity of aim and pattern
which must underlie all our communal efforts, including the economic
because of its crucial and determining importance." " 3 The sooner that this
is realized, the sooner "shall we all work to create a genuine self-
government in industry."'" 14
Perhaps most important was the extent to which and the ways in which
Green took up these arguments as the labor movement agitated for the
passage of the NLRA. In 1934, it was clear that the Recovery Act had no
teeth. So when the NLRA had its first real chance of passage, Green argued
in a speech in Akron, Ohio, "In a democracy such as ours it is but proper
and right that we should extend the principles of democracy, not only in
government but in industry."' 1 5 That year he also argued that labor was the
"defender of American institutions and American self-government" and that
the "salvation of labor lies in democracy." '" 6 In 1935, he argued that "upon
the character of these work relationships will rest the real measure of self-
government in the United States."' "1 Labor's consistent move therefore was
to anchor political and economic liberty around self-government, and to
espouse a vision of economic liberty centered on union association as an
embodiment of worker self-government.
Although these movement actors did not condemn Lochnerism by
name," 18 they worked against its internal logic. They offered ethical and
purposive arguments about what the constitutional commitment to
"freedom as self-government" meant and required, connecting worker
association to economic liberty. While the Taft Court's "use of substantive
due process appealed to the pieties of everyday, normal life"' 19 in defining
freedom, these movement actors argued that the conditions of interaction
within the industrial sphere did not make liberty possible. They saw that
zone of work-life as one where contracting was unbalanced and hardly
represented a process of willful deliberation between employers and
human experience with preservation of individual rights and concentrations of power that thwarted it
led to the conclusion that "in the long run, people have to protect themselves and govern themselves, if
their own wishes and aspirations are to be realized." Id. at 224. They argued that this conclusion extends
not only to politics but to economic systems, and said that "our economic life has to be governed; and
the purpose of such government no less than its general methods have to harmonize with that purpose
already established as sound in political government." Id. at 226.
113. Id. at 228.
114. Id.
115. William Green, President, AFL, Address at Akron, Ohio (November 24, 1934).
116. William Green, Speech (d. 1934), in William Green Papers, Yale University, New Haven, CT,
box 18.
117. William Green, Editorial, AM. FEDERATIONIST, March 1935, at 242.
118. See Greene, The Anticanon, supra note 1, for an account of how Lochner came to stand in as
the representative of this conception of freedom.
119. Post, supra note 34, at 1494.
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employees; it was one where our foundational constitutional commitments
to self-government and democratic life were weak. They located freedom
in the association between workers, which was for them an exercise of
freedom that, though not the self-government of our democratic order in the
political realm, was an image in work-life, and a bulwark against
unbalanced workplace power. Thus while, as Post recognizes, the "Taft
Court... never articulated why constitutional value ought to attach to the
expectations of everyday [economic] life, 1 20 these actors were telling a
different story about what everyday life looked like and how the nation's
core constitutional commitment to self-government would be fleshed out
best in economic life.
The question is whether this conception of freedom would be adopted
beyond the labor movement and intellectuals. It is to this question of
translation that the next sections turn.
B. Congress
Senator Robert Wagner of New York, who had long focused on and
struggled for workers' rights, 121 was a driving force behind a national labor
law. In 1934, Wagner believed that the nation's labor movement and
commitment to workers was strong enough to push for a signature
legislative enactment. The path had been cleared a bit with piecemeal
enactments. For example, as mentioned above, Congress had just recently
passed the Recovery Act, which attempted to place the nation's industries
under codes of conduct and theoretically, in section 7(a), provided workers
the right to bargain collectively. But the Recovery Act was flouted by
employers,122 and Wagner knew that a stronger bill--establishing not only
the right of workers to bargain collectively but also firmer institutional
mechanisms to ensure that right-was needed. He therefore proposed the
NLRA and placed center-stage the labor movement's ethical and purposive
arguments about worker association and self-government.1 23
The consideration of the bill was kicked off in 1934 when Senator
Copeland placed in the record an article that Senator Wagner had penned in
The New York Times in support of the bill. In the article, Wagner asserted
that "major questions of self-expression and democracy are involved" in the
120. Id. at 1530.
121. See, e.g., J. JOSEPH HUTCHMACHER, ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RISE OF URBAN
LIBERALISM 3-38 (1968).
122. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 137-45 (1958)
(explaining how employers put pressure on employees and set up company unions, which prohibited
workers from joining with other unions or workers from other employers, sapping collective bargaining
of its power).
123. For all fuller history of the legislative struggles and of Wagner's vision of freedom, and of the
sampling of different arguments made, see Barenberg, supra note 10; and Forbath, supra note 10.
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ability of workers to be free to associate in unions. 124 He continued that at
"a time when politics is becoming impersonalized and the average worker
is remote from the processes of government, it is more imperative than ever
before that industry should afford him real opportunities to participate in the
determination of economic issues.' 25 Wagner was therefore setting up a
relationship between political self-government and economic self-
government. Wagner continued on to make clear that it was our democratic
conmitments-"our most cherished ideals" 126-that mandated recognition
and protection of this associational freedom.
The Senate Report would strengthen the link, construing worker
association as an important aspect of constitutional freedom. Worker self-
government, the Senate Report that came out of the committee hearings
declared, simply attempted to be true to "rights that were inherent in
citizenship," including the right "to be free to form or join organizations, to
designate representatives, and to engage in concerted activities."'2 7 That is,
the Senate Report drew from political association towards worker
association, linking political citizenship and economic self-determination.
Speaking of the disenfranchisement of the "citizen-worker" who could not
form unions together with fellow employees to secure bargaining power and
participate in workplace democracy, the Report continued, "[a] worker in
the field of industry, like a citizen in the field of government," has "an
inherent right" to "self-government."' 28 This was an important form of
ethical argument: we as a nation are committed to self-government and that
commitment stretches beyond the confines of politics.
However, the debate would not go far during 1934. The Senate ultimately
ended its session without passing the NLRA, as FDR intervened with a
measure to strengthen the Recovery Act. What followed was the "volcanic
summer of 1934," when workers across the country protested and went on
strike in the name of what they saw as the right to bargain collectively. 129 As
labor historian Irving Bernstein told it, "In 1934 anybody struck.' 130 These
strikes included the ranks of workers in the automotive industry in the
Midwest, the longshoremen on the coasts, and workers in the cotton and
textile industries in New England and the South. 13'
When the Senate reconvened in 1935, a summer of protest was behind
124. Robert F. Wagner, Company Unions: A Vast Industrial Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1934, §
9, at I (reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 4229 (1934)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. S. REP. No. 79-1184, at 4 (1934).
128. Id.
129. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 342-44 (1950).
130. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933-
1941 315 (1969).
131. Id.
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them. Wagner took the floor and began, sharpening the points from last year
with an increased emphasis on liberty, that the legislation was aimed to
"make men free in the economic and the political field" by allowing them
to organize and self-govern in unions not simply as a matter of extension
but rather, continuing the constitutional narrative, to ensure "the
preservation of long-recognized fundamental rights. '132 Of course, labor
organizing what was not a long-recognized fundamental right, but Wagner's
point drew strength from his claim about the meaning of self-government
as our ethic more so than tradition.
Between the Senate's deliberations and vote to pass the bill and the start
of the House's, momentum was proceeding for passage, when, on May 27,
in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., the Supreme Court struck down Title I
of the Recovery Act, which had provided, at least in theory, union
association rights. 133 But the Court's decision only produced momentum in
Congress to pass the NLRA, and it motivated FDR to support it. Moreover,
Wagner and his colleagues in Congress believed that the NLRA did not
suffer from the same constitutional issues as the Recovery Act since the
NLRA involved labor issues with more of a direct effect on interstate
commerce. 
134
As deliberations proceeded in the House, Congressman Withrow argued,
"The right of self-government through fairly chosen representatives is a
right which is inherent to the American people and to our American form
of government. The bill does no more than guarantee that right to labor. 1' 35
This is a clear instance of ethical constitutional argument: self-government
is the American ethic, and we ought to conceive of self-government as
having application beyond the nominally political sphere. Congressman
Mead argued that the bill would give "to our industrial workers the same
general idea of freedom that the founding fathers conferred upon citizens of
the United States. '136 Freedom was therefore located in worker self-
government, a form of self-government based on and guaranteed by our
nation's constitutional commitments.
Debate continued and congressmen continued to link union association
to freedom. On July 5, 1935, FDR signed the NLRA into law and gave pens
to Wagner and William Green. The Act "encouraged" collective
bargaining, protecting worker "freedom of association" against employer
coercion aimed at thwarting collective bargaining, and set up the
institutional administrative mechanisms to enforce the Act, giving newer
and clearer powers to the National Labor Relations Board.
132. 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (statement of Sen. Wagner).
133. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
134. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 130, at 342-344.
135. 79 CONG. REC. 9691 (statement of Rep. Withrow) (1935).
136. 79 CONG. REC. 9710 (statement of Rep. Mead) (1935).
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C. FDR
As he campaigned for the reelection in 1936, FDR defended the passage
of the NLRA, and spoke of freedom in economic life as a necessary
corollary to political freedom.137 FDR's acceptance speech for the
Democratic nomination took place in Philadelphia. Over 100,000 people
gathered to hear a speech that Senator Wagner and Donald Richberg,
another labor law architect, had helped to draft. In the speech, FDR argued
that "political freedom" must also extend to prohibit "economic slavery,"
that the "right to work" was no less central to citizenship than "the right to
vote," and that the very "liberty of democracy" is not safe otherwise. 38 FDR
thus drew from the cornerstone commitments of the constitutional order and
argued for the necessity of their expression in economic life.
Mimicking the moves of the labor movement and Congress, and in some
ways synthesizing them, FDR argued that constitutional self-government
extends beyond the political realm: "For too many of us the political
equality we once had won was meaningless in the face of economic
inequality .... For too many of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer
real; men could no longer follow the pursuit of happiness.' 1 39 FDR then
argued that political liberty required that we recognize other liberties. He
spoke to the constitutional consequences of putting "economic and financial
control in the hands of the few," which would result in "the destruction of
the base of our form of government" and "an autocratic form of
government.' 40 He proclaimed, "Today we stand committed to the
proposition that freedom is no half-and-half affair. If the average citizen is
guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling place, he must have equal
opportunity in the marketplace."' 141 He was arguing, as scholars put it, that
"[s]ocial and economic citizenship were simply inseparable from political
citizenship."' 142 They were entwined in a constitutional order that was
economic as well as political.
As he campaigned in the months ahead, FDR pitted industrial control
137. Members of FDR's Administration, of course, also made the same argument and their support
of this view was evident as early as 1933. For example, at a meeting of the 1933 Convention of the
American Federation of Labor, General Hugh Johnson, the Administrator of the Recovery
Administration, which now at least theoretically guaranteed workers the right to bargain collectively,
took up the point. He began by discussing Jefferson's limited idea of self-government, then, charting a
familiar path, spoke of the complexity and interdependence of society, remarking that, given this, "self-
government today" could not exist only in things political but also needed to be achieved in part "through
groups in labor." General Hugh S. Johnson, The New Order, AM. FEDERATIONIST, November 1933, at
1181.
138. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency (June 27, 1936),
in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 230 (1938).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 9, at 691.
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against economic self-government through worker association. On Labor
Day, he spoke of how before the "hours men and women worked, the wages
they received, the conditions of their labor-these had passed beyond the
control of the people and were imposed by this new industrial
dictatorship." 143 He then connected the labor movement and union
association to an economic liberty based in political liberty: "The Fourth of
July commemorates our political freedom-a freedom which without
economic freedom is meaningless indeed. Labor Day symbolizes our
determination to achieve an economic freedom for the average man which
will give his political freedom reality."' 144 The labor movement and the
country, he continued, were "building an economic democracy."' 145
D. The Court
In the national struggle of the New Deal era, the Supreme Court not only
undermined Lochner but also came to see worker association as a
fundamental exercise of liberty. To be sure, the Court did not consider
whether this liberty was one protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' Due Process Clauses. For good reason, however: substantive
due process doctrine applies only to governmental, not private, deprivations
of liberty. As the labor movement, Congress, and FDR understood it,
because the NLRA enacted the right of workers to bargain collectively, the
national government was facilitating worker freedom of association,
protecting rather than burdening a liberty right. The question was whether
the Court would agree.
The Court would. Consider the Court's transition. In Lochner the "right
to contract" without state intervention was "part of the liberty of the
individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."'146 In West Coast
Hotel, where the Court again considered the constitutionality of a state
minimum wage law, there was a shift. "What is freedom?" the Court asked,
continuing that the "Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract."' 47
The Court recognized how economic ordering had changed: "Liberty in
each of its phases has its history and connotation."'' 48 The Court then
explored the phase of history at hand. Focusing on the unequal distribution
of power between employers and employees, as well as their conflicting
interests, the Court stated that:
[Employers] naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from
143. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, On Farmers and Laborers (Sept. 6, 1936).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 198 U.S. at 53.
147. 300 U.S. at 391.
148. Id.
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their employ[ee]s, while the latter are often induced by the fear of
discharge to conform to regulations which their judgment, fairly
exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental to their health or
strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules and the
laborers are practically constrained to obey them. In such cases, self-
interest is often an unsafe guide, and the legislature may properly
interpose its authority.149
Note the transformation. Liberty was no longer located in the exchange,
because the exchange became an unbalanced form of "self-interest." The
Court continued that "recent economic experience" had shown not only
workers' "unequal position with respect to bargaining" but also the
deleterious effects of this, because "denial of a living wage is not only
detrimental to their health and well being, but casts a direct burden for their
support on the community. 1 50 Rather than speaking abstractly about
contract, the Court focused on the parties, their social lives, and the extent
to which contracting could reflect their actual freedom. The Court
concluded that the contract was often not one of parity and, therefore, that
setting a minimum wage did not impinge upon the liberty protected by
substantive due process doctrine. Indeed, in light of the health and security
concerns of citizens, it concluded that the regulation was well within the
state's power.1 51
A couple of weeks later, the Court handed down its opinion in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Company.152 There, the Court considered the
constitutionality of Section I of the NLRA, particularly whether Congress
could regulate labor-management disputes under the Commerce Clause.
The Court concluded that it could, because the statute reached and regulated
labor disputes such as strikes that would have an "obvious" and "potentially
catastrophic" effect on interstate commerce. 53 Along the way, worker
organization became for the Court a "fundamental right" and one which the
Court touted for its features of "free exercise," "self-representation," and
"freedom of choice.1 154 Workers had a right to select "representatives of
their own choosing"'155 and to "self-organization and freedom."' 5 6 Thus, the
Court was making a closing statement about economic freedom: economic
149. Id. at 394.
150. Id. at 399.
151. Id.
152. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
153. Id. at 40; see also id. at 37 ("Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be
denied the power to exercise that control.").
154. [d. at 33.
155. Id.
156. Id. at43
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freedom was embodied in the labor union and was lawfully protected by the
NLRA.
The Court's analysis had several remarkable features. First, following the
language employed by Wagner and other congressmen in legislative
deliberations, the Court conceived of labor organization as a "fundamental
right." This was no hollow claim: it was a constitutional claim. Second,
when describing why the right both exists and reaches fundamental status,
the Court analogized labor association to political association, focusing on
representation and exercise. One could pluck out the Court's various
sentences and think it was speaking about First Amendment freedom of
association of citizens attempting to associate to elect political
representatives rather than worker association. This, I take it, is the point.
The opinion therefore harmonizes with the theory put forward by labor,
congressional leaders, and FDR: it links the right of labor organization to
the exercise of freedom and self-governing qualities in the economic sphere.
With this decision, it was no longer necessary to "masquerade" 157 a labor
law as a health or safety law. Labor organization was now a form of self-
organization and an exercise of freedom.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin is, in this regard, an important decision in the
struggle to define economic liberty. While West Coast Hotel Co. is
recognized for undermining the premises of Lochnerism, the extent to
which the Court went to make an affirmative statement about how economic
liberty is really expressed in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin matters; it closes
the circle. And although NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin is not a substantive due
process case, the Court does identify labor organizing as a "fundamental
right" of "freedom and self-organization." This suggests that a substantive
due process claim could be made upon a state deprivation. As Justice
Brandeis stated in Whitney v. California, substantive due process doctrine
protects "all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty." '158 The
delineation of worker self-organization as one such "fundamental right" of
"freedom" sets up the logical premises for the application of substantive due
process in the face of a governmental deprivation of collective bargaining
rights. 159
157. Nourse, supra note 41, at 768.
158. Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357, 373 (1927). This proposition was cited with authority in
Casey as the Court described substantive due process. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847.
159. And while one might ask whether burdening workers' association rights is a significant enough
infringement of an important freedom to justify such a decision, it is not clear that union organization is
any less important than, say, having one's child learn a particular language or choosing a particular
school. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Its importance, indeed, made labor struggles the "dominant focus of public life" during the era. FONER,
supra note 55, at 118. One might also question whether impeding the State from burdening union
association is problematic because doing so shifts the balance between employers and employees. But
substantive due process cases, in prohibiting the State from burdening freedom, always bear upon
institutional structures, including the State's ability to control schools, regulate prisons, regulate
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It is also worth noting that when the Supreme Court protected worker
association rights under the First Amendment less than a decade later, it at
times seemed to engage in substantive due process-like reasoning. In 1945,
the Supreme Court held in Thomas v. Collins that the "rights of assembly
and discussion" of a union are protected by the First Amendment. 60 In so
finding, the Court stated that its task was to discern "where the individual's
freedom ends and the State's power begins.' 6' This is nearly exactly the
formulation of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Uliman-the precursor
case to Griswold-where he set up modern substantive due process
doctrine, focusing on how the doctrine parses the balance between "the
liberty of the individual" and the "demands of organized society."' 62
The similarity in reasoning makes sense: The First Amendment has been
offered as an additional textual justification for substantive due process
doctrine, 163 and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process doctrine
protects forms of activity and association that often find refuge as well in
the First.I64 At the same time, when the Court protected the association
right, it did so under a traditional First Amendment framework, and it was
making a different move than that made by the New Deal architects. It was
not analogizing worker association to political association; it was asking
whether worker association directly bore on political discussion. 165
domestic affairs, and so on. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1978); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86;
Pierce, 262 U.S. 390; Meyer, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). And a constitutional decision, like the one ultimately
protecting worker association fights under the First Amendment discussed below, would not necessarily
require employers to bargain with unions; that requirement would be statutorily, rather than
constitutionally, imposed. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945).
160. 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945).
161. 323 U.S. at 528.
162. 367 U.S. at 539 (stating that substantive due process "represent[s] the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty
and the demands of organized society").
163. See Tribe, supra note 21, at 1939.
164. Consider, for example, the sources that indicate that intimate association is protected by not
only the Fourteenth but also the First Amendment. See, e.g., Starling v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 602 F.3d
1257, 1260 (11 th Cir. 2010) (describing the "First Amendment right to intimate association"); Kenneth
L. Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 655 (1980).
165. The Court thus concluded that "[f]ree discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the
cause of labor disputes" is "indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular
government to shape the destiny of modem industrial society." 323 U.S. at 523. The Court continued
that to draw a line between economic and political association would be "at once too simple, too general,
and too inaccurate to be determinative." Id. at 531. But this was so because of the link to political self-
determination: "Labor is free to turn its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard wages, employer
unfairness, or objectionable working conditions." Id. at 547.Labor disputes therefore related also to the
"public need for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times." Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); see also id. at 102-03 ("In the circumstances of our times the
dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area
of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. It is recognized now that satisfactory hours and
wages and working conditions in industry and a bargaining position which makes these possible have
an importance which is not less than the interests of those in the business or industry directly concerned.
The health of the present generation and of those as yet unborn may depend on these matters, and the
practices in a single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region and affect
widespread systems of marketing. The merest glance at State and Federal legislation on the subject
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That said, the Court also gestured towards a more capacious protection of
freedom of worker association, which was, as Aviam Soifer put it, "not
limited to political or religious matters" and indeed "broad enough to
include private as well as public gatherings, economic as well as political
subjects. 1 66 That conception would narrow over the years, as the Court
would come to focus its freedom of association jurisprudence on intimate
and expressive association, linking the latter to its role in the political
process. 67 Intimate association would become the refuge for "non-
political" association, and it would, perhaps surprisingly, draw the Court
right back into the heart of substantive due process jurisprudence.
E. Synthesis: Association and Liberty
As the sections above show, the history of the repudiation of Lochnerism
is also the history of the federal government accepting an alternative vision
of economic freedom rooted in worker association and decision-making. In
this section, I consider the how that alternative vision transformed the
American concept of economic liberty at the center of the constitutional
political economy.
By likening relations between workers in the economic sphere to the
relations between citizens in the polity-putting forward both associations
as ones where freedom is exercised-the architects of the New Deal made
an important move. They challenged the then-prevailing notion that politics
was a complex organizational sphere where collective decision-making
occurred and where freedom was therefore exercised by participating in
self-government and that other domains would somehow order themselves
to be conducive to freedom if we could only, say, spread property
broadly. 168 The mistake of Lochnerism, as Owen Fiss explores in his
volume on the Court during the era, was to assume that the conditions of
ordering within social and economic spheres would reflect liberty only if
the state left them alone by, for example, not regulating employment
contracts. 169 This Article has thus far shown how the New Deal architects
instead showed that the transition to a system of wage-earning had made
economic life a complex organizational sphere where governance
demonstrates the force of the argument that labor relations are not matters of mere local or private
concern.") (internal citations omitted).
166. Aviam Soifer, Freedom of Association: Indian Tribes, Workers, and Communal Ghosts, 48
MARYLAND L. REv. 350,363 (1989). At the same time, the Court connected labor association to political
discussion. The Court concluded that "[f]ree discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the
cause of labor disputes" is "indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular
government to shape the destiny of modem industrial society." 323 U.S. at 523; see also Thomhill, 310
U.S. at 102-103.
167. See generally id.; see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
168. See Fiss, supra note 36, at 157-59, 389-90.
169. See id.
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arrangements bore on the existence or absence of freedom. In this way,
these New Deal architects chipped at the wall of negative liberty and its
assumption of state non-interference, and provided growing recognition of
the social conditions of freedom.
The New Deal therefore offered a practical philosophy that did not so
much challenge the model of economic ordering based on the agrarian
entrepreneur who in the absence of restraint enjoyed liberty to farm from
his property and create his own enterprise, as much as it undermined its
ability to meaningfully bear upon the world that citizens inhabited. The
citizen, we learned, must work, which becomes its own complex endeavor.
The states' agnosticism toward the economic ordering of work could mean,
for the citizen, seven days' work per week or five, eighty hours' work or
forty, being hired in the mill village with his or her children or sending the
children to school, having a wage that allows him or her to afford a life
outside work or not, and so on. A citizen's best chance at avoiding
domination in this complex social sphere comes through an act that takes
its image from the political: joining with co-workers in association, forming
together a will, and using their power to bargain for basic forms of security,
the kind of security that underlies individual freedom and republican
citizenship. The model conducive to economic freedom becomes the factory
rather than the farm, and association rather than isolation.
The New Deal therefore worked against a purely negative conception of
liberty in an economic sphere that was before-conceived as a purely private
sphere. To fill the blank, yawning space that had defined negative freedom
in private life, the architects of the New Deal turned to the features of
association that defined political freedom. They broke down the features
and attributes of self-government and grafted political notions of
association, exercise, and collective decision-making onto a private sphere
of ordering, showing how these could be indicia of the social conditions of
freedom within the sphere and how they were reflected in labor association.
The New Deal transformation thus etched into our constitutional
architecture the idea that forming a collective will could become an exercise
of freedom with resonance beyond the political domain. Economic life, the
architects of the New Deal knew, looked more like political life than the
proponents of Lochnerism presumed. Economic life was a domain of
struggle, solidarity, resource distribution, and mutual interdependence. In
such a domain, collective solutions were palatable. Since the sum and
substance of political liberty was that the people formed in association to
make important decisions together in mutual regard, the New Dealers drew
from this an account of worker freedom in association.
Thus, while Americans had offered a rich, associative, and exercise-based
conception of political liberty, that notion had been accompanied by a
simplistic view of social and economic life, so serenely ordered to produce
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liberty without effort or coordination, a notion which could not keep up with
the manner in which industrialism introduced forms of governance and
interdependence into the economic sphere. As the basis for a thick and
active notion of political liberty and a thin and negative notion of private
liberty began to dissipate with the Industrial Revolution, labor could not rest
its hopes on the right to be let alone: it formed its image of liberty in the
image of the state's freedom, and eventually turned to the state for
recognition. Its claim resonated not in the absence of restraint but instead in
the immanent value of association, exercise, and mutual will-formation.
Labor's freedom took its shape and form, and its value, from constitutional
freedom. There was no theory of labor's freedom without first making
reference to the state's freedom.
By analogizing from political liberty exercised in association towards an
account of economic liberty, the architects of the New Deal order did
something larger, something perhaps even they could not predict. By being
sensitive to the relationships within the economic sphere 70 and transporting
the attributes of self-governing association onto association within it, they
provided a clue as to what liberty might mean in previously-identified
"private" spheres more generally. Suddenly, the economic world looked
different. Perhaps it was only a matter of time before other social domains
would follow course.
III. POST-GRISWOLD SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process was not laid to rest with Lochnerism. As the
Supreme Court exhumed the doctrine in Griswold, it made it clear that its
endeavor was miles-and decades-removed from Lochnerism. At the
same time, the Court developed a strand within the doctrine protecting
intimate association. But the Court's efforts to fashion a doctrine tailor-
made for intimate life and distanced from the economic struggles over
liberty in the first half of the twentieth century led it to miss just how
connected its endeavor to define intimate liberty was to the New Deal
endeavor to define economic liberty. The architects of the New Deal and
the architects of modem substantive due process both in part define freedom
around "non-political" association, and in this way are importantly linked.
In the latter case, however, the model is the marital union rather than the
labor union. Thus, the association would not be economic in the modem
sense, but instead would return to the roots from which the word "economy"
was defined-the home-and define intimate freedom within that
170. Bruce Ackerman focuses on how the New Deal offered a sphere by sphere approach, which
animates both the civil rights revolution and modem substantive due process cases. 3 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION ch. 13 (2013). His account, however, does
not focus on how the attributes of political self-government structure and guide the spherical analysis.
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domain. ' 7'
A. The Ghost of Lochnerism
The Supreme Court again turned to employing substantive due process
as, on the heels of the women's liberation movement and the gradual
transformation of American family life, movements brought questions
about women's reproductive autonomy and citizens' personal and sexual
rights to the Court to respond to what they conceived of as governmental
deprivations of liberty. 72
As the doctrine again became central to a battle to define liberty, its
detractors were quick to note its problematic earlier association with
Lochnerism. And, even those who think the doctrine has continuing vitality
have noted its shaky foundations in the first half of the twentieth century.
Under this account, Meyer v. Nebraska173 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters' 74-- cases about the liberty of parents to raise their children and make
educational decisions for them-are regarded the "two sturdiest pillars of
the substantive due process era" and the "survivors of the largely discredited
Lochner era."'1 75 And so, the narrative goes, Lochnerism collapsed, leaving
only these two cases in the early 20th century canon, and substantive due
process was dormant until 1965, when it was "reborn in the guise of
Griswold v. Connecticut."'176 It then marched its path from Griswold7 7 to
Obergefell v Hodges. 178
Judges and scholars who criticize the doctrine rely on this narrative about
the shaky foundations of the doctrine and those who employ it must explain
how the case before them differs from the string of cases preceding West
Coast Hotel Co. 179 However, the Court's hurry to cast off the history of the
171. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L. J. 677, 799 (1999) (noting that economics is "derived from the ancient Greek
word 'oikos,' meaning 'house').
172. See DAVID J. GARROW, LtBERTY AND SEXUALITY (1998); Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth
Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915
(1990); Eskridge, supra note 28, at 2236-40; see also Ryan L. Williams, The Paths to Griswold, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2155 (2014) (emphasizing the doctrinal and jurisprudential debates and shifts that
led to Griswold).
173. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (overturning a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages
to children on the grounds that the law interfered with the liberty of the parents to raise their children).
174. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down an Oregon law that mandated that students attend public
schools on the ground that it interfered with the liberty of parents to raise their children).
175. Tribe, supra note 21, at 1934.
176. Id. In a precursor to Griswold, Justice Harlan foreshadowed its substantive due process
reasoning. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
177. 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
178. 567 U.S. (2015).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. -, slip. op. at 17 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the majority never utters the "dread words 'substantive due process' and noting its state of
disrepair); Casey, 505 U.S. at 864 (explaining how the premises underlying Lochner had been proven
to be untrue and therefore why West Coast Hotel Co. was decided the way it was and why the doctrine
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constitutional struggle surrounding economic freedom makes it throw away
valuable resources and miss important connections. The New Deal embrace
of a liberty right to economic association is linked to the Court's eventual
embrace of a right to intimate association.
B. Griswold and Intimate Association
Griswold brought the Court into a battle over contraception and family
planning. Two features about the Court's decision are relevant. The first is
its understanding of Lochnerism and its repudiation, and the second is how
the Court continues, though in fits and starts, the New Deal mode of
constitutional reasoning that rejected Lochnerism, placing the Court on a
path towards recognizing a liberty-based right to intimate association.
The statute at issue in Griswold prohibited the use of "any drug, medicinal
article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception."'1 80 The law
had been challenged before in Poe v. Ullman, but the Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal, concluding that since there was no threat of
prosecution, or prosecution itself, there was no case or controversy. 181
Justice Harlan dissented, urging the Court to take the case and expounding
the meaning of the doctrine. He wrote that:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not
a series of isolated points pricked out [but is a] rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints. 82
Justice Harlan thus framed substantive due process as being about
negative liberty, the "liberty of the individual," and the balance "struck
between that liberty and the demands of organized society.1 83
The issue came to the Court again after a birth control clinic was opened
and an arrest made. The Court, in a deeply divided opinion, 184 concluded
that the married couple challenging the statute had standing and that the
statute unconstitutionally infringed on the "zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees,"'185 among them the Due
Process Clause and the First Amendment "right of 'association,' [which is]
more than the right to attend a meeting [and] includes the right to express
has continuing vitality).
180. 381 U.S. at 480.
181. 367 U.S. at 516-22.
182. 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 542.
184. There were three concurrences (Justices Goldberg, Harlan, and White) and two dissents
(Justices Black and Stewart). See id. at 487-530.
185. Id. at 485.
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one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by
affiliation."186
As the Court employed substantive due process doctrine anew, it
struggled awkwardly with the doctrine's history. The Court rejected the
notion that Lochner "should be [their] guide," deciding that they did not sit
as a "super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws
that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions."' 87 The
Court thus appeared to move away from any consideration of the economic
sphere and the constitutional struggles that took place within it during the
early to mid-twentieth century, turning to the seemingly safer personal and
intimate sphere by stating that unlike laws that "touch" economic problems
or social conditions, the Connecticut law "operate[d] directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife."'1 88 Like Meyer and Pierce, Griswold was
seemingly an acceptable use of the doctrine because it dealt with a personal
realm, rather than the economic realm.
The Court, however, was misguided in its reading of history. Lochner was
not concerned with determining the "wisdom, need, and propriety" of laws
that touch economic problems; it was concerned, rightly so, with protecting
liberty in the workplace in the face of an alleged governmental deprivation.
The issue was how it defined liberty initially-but, if we take NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin seriously, only initially. More importantly, by turning its gaze
away from the struggles to define freedom in the economic sphere, the Court
turns away from a constitutional struggle that, when fully understood,
involves the protection of "non-political" forms of association-the very
protection the Court itself would engage in as it established a liberty-based
right to intimate association over the next few decades. The Court could
have benefitted from a stronger understanding of the history of the era.
Begin with the Court's first move. Just as New Dealers drew from the
image of political association as an exercise of freedom and analogized it to
economic association, Griswold analogized political association to intimate
association. The Court cited First Amendment case law on the "association
of people" and spoke to the "protection of forms of 'association' that are
not political in the customary sense, but pertain to the social, legal, and
economic benefit of their members.1 89 Scholars rightly critique this move
by noting that the Court cites cases about the freedom of political
association that, historically, had nothing to do with intimate association.190
186. Id. at 483.
187. Id. at 482.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 117-118 (2012) ("The core Founding-era right of 'the people' to 'assemble'
centers on citizens' entitlement to gather in public conventions and other political meeting grounds.").
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Scholars comment that the freedom of association referenced in those cases
draws from a Founding notion of the people associating in the political
sphere and is "miles removed from the erotic urges of a man and woman
seeking to 'assemble' on a bed." 191
However, once one takes the New Deal's move of focusing on associative
exercises of liberty beyond the political sphere, where important choice-
making and mutual self-direction occurs, and analogizing those associations
to political association at the core of constitutional liberty, the move in
Griswold is not so novel. Counterpoised against the traditionally negative
and individualistic conceptions of private liberty in American life, the New
Deal provides a foundation for liberty rights-reasoning in the context of the
marital relationship: likening mutual self-determination and choice-making
to political association, and from the attributes of political association,
deriving an exercise account of freedom in the personal sphere. The Court,
that is, was being analogical in a New Deal fashion.
While the Court both relied on a notion of associational freedom, and
drew support, like New Dealers, from political concepts of association, its
analytical framework for discussing intimate association as a liberty-based
right was somewhat weak. This may be explained by the fact that Justice
Douglas, who was assigned the opinion, initially wrote a stronger opinion
focusing on freedom of association and intimacy, strengthening the analogy
between political association and intimate association, but Justice Brennan
urged him to pivot more towards privacy. 192 Had Justice Douglas not been
convinced by Justice Brennan, the connection between the New Deal theory
of association and Griswold may have been stronger.
Instead, the Court oddly mixed liberty and privacy without strong
doctrinal or theoretical clarification of either concept. As the Court outlined
the forms of intimate and personal association between husband and wife at
stake, it did not flesh out in rich detail how marriage was an association
where persons exercise freedom, honing in on the choices that couples
make together which define their freedom. The Court turned instead to how
the intimate associations linked to "zones of privacy."'1 93 Its examples
turned to the home, and the "penumbral rights of 'privacy and repose.""'194
Marriage, then, became "a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights."' 195
The Court thus appeared to return to negative liberty, but only momentarily.
It continued that marriage was "a coming together for better or for worse,
191. Id.
192. See John D. Inazu, The Unsettling "Well-Settled" Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN.
L. REV. 149, 159 (2010) (overviewing the exchange between Justices Douglas and Brennan); see also
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 237 (1985).
193. Id. at 484.
194. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
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hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred" and "an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects."' 96
In one way, the latter part of this passage positions Griswold as the
inheritor and continuer of the logic of the New Deal transformation. The
Court is engaging in a sphere-sensitive inquiry, focusing on how the
association "promotes" a particular way of life that is unique to the sphere
and produces a "harmony in living." The case is thus not merely about the
right to be let alone on the assumption that the intimate order will naturally
produce the conditions of liberty. It focuses on the marital union as an
exercise in a particular type of living and association that embodied liberty,
and draws from First Amendment political association to structure its
analysis about liberty within intimate association.
Reasoning from Griswold, Laurence Tribe thus writes that "it was the
supposed sanctity of another and more personal version of self-government,
that of the marriage contract, that gave the Court its rhetorical and
philosophical entree."' 97 It is possible to read the opinion as Tribe does, and
doing so would strengthen the link between the New Deal protection of
associational freedom and Griswold. But the problem is that the Court does
not provide much basis for the conclusion that marriage is a personal
version of self-government. When the Court speaks of marriage as an
important form of association, it heads in the direction of defining a sphere
of mutual self-direction, especially when it notes that such an association
"promotes a way of life." Nevertheless, all of that language is framed in a
sentence that begins with marriage as a "right of privacy." Privacy is thus
not linked merely to reproduction; it is linked to the Court's definition of
martial association as liberty-based.
One need not think long to understand the various ways in which marriage
is a public and communal institution as much as a private one. 198 As
Kenneth Karst said, "We pay a price for this judicial evasion. Calling the
right[] in Griswold... [one] of privacy invites the rejection of comparable
claims on the ground that, after all, they do not rest on any concerns about
control over the disclosure of information."' 99 That is, not all exercises of
liberty within the scope of intimate association are private ones-think of
the public and communal aspects related to entering into and continuing
marriage-but this does not mean that they are not deserving of
constitutional solicitude.
At the same time, the pivot towards privacy in Griswold may have
196. Id.
197. Tribe, Fundamental Right, supra note 21, at 1939.
198. See, e.g., Allison Anna Tait, Polygamy, Publicity, and Locality: The Place of the Public in
Marriage, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 171 (2011).
199. Karst, supra note 164, at 664.
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reflected the state of marital relationships at the time. The marital household
was in flux as the efforts for gender equality upended notions of household
arrangement, career planning, gender roles, and more.z00 The efforts for
gender equality during the era were precipitated in part on viewing marital
association through the lens of self-government: on ensuring that the private
domain would shift from "a hierarchical relationship, premised on gender
complementarity, to one of mutual self-government, premised on gender
equality. '201 Viewing martial association through the lens of self-
government connects it to the New Deal. Of course, one can doubt that the
model of self-government is as apt an analogy for the married couple as it
is for the labor union, 202 and still agree that the transformation of marriage
through the prism of gender equality makes an account of associative
freedom stronger.203 Transforming marriage to provide increased forms of
equal respect and willful choice-making is important to establishing a
stronger account of associational liberty.204
Even considering the state of flux, one can wonder whether the Court, in
light of its views about then-existing "bilateral choice" and "harmony" in
200. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, IN OUR TIME: A MEMOIR OF REVOLUTION 102-35 (1999);
FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1960 (1991);
KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 92-125 (1984); LINDA C. MCCLAN,
THE PLACE OF FAMILIES, FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY chs. 2 & 3 (2006);
see generally LAURI UMANKSY, MOTHERHOOD RECONCEIVED: FEMINISM AND THE LEGACIES OF THE
SIXTIES (1996).
201. See MCCLAIN, supra note 200, at 60-61; see also Tribe, supra note 21, at 1899 (describing his
project as "relating the approach the Court took in Lawrence to the overarching concepts o individual
and collective self-government-that is, to the ways in which the commitments we make to our
principles and to one another, in the context of associations ranging from the most intimate to those with
the polity as a whole, constitute the essential core of constitutionalism and the cornerstone of American
liberty") (emphasis added); id. at 1939 (describing the marriage contract as "another and more personal
version of self-government").
202. Unlike labor unions, married couples need not follow regularized, majoritarian decision-
making processes, and one would suspect that most do not, happily settling for more informal processes.
There are many ways to organize a marital relationship, and some veer rather far from the image in
mind.
203. While my endeavor in this Part is to connect the affirmation of association in post-Griswold
jurisprudence to the New Deal affirmation of association, it is not to argue normatively about whether
marriage generally reflects or promotes freedom.
204. The ongoing struggle to transform marriage as an institution reflecting gender equality can be
viewed through the lens of the New Deal reordering of private spheres. First, the transformation has
New Deal linkages insofar as citizens came to recognize that the marital relationship, like the workplace,
was not perfectly ordered to enable liberty if the state left it be; it was a social domain, full possibilities
for both domination and freedom, flourishing and floundering, among other things. The untangling of
the mystical image of coverture-with husband and wife transforming into a juridical entity through
which the husband spoke for both-reflected a frank confrontation with the social conditions of freedom
in marriage. The transformation of wives into juridical actors played important role, beginning at least
with trust forms such as the separate estate. See Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of
Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married Woman's Separate Estate, 26 YALE J. L. & FEM. 1 (2014)
("Through the configuration of the wife as a separate entity, this jurisprudence created fissures in the
brittle surface of coverture and introduced the idea of divided household sovereignty."). The end of
coverture and the shift towards gender equality share with the demise of Lochnerism the insight that
power imbalances exist in private spheres, and that an account of negative liberty will leave the state
unresponsive to those imbalances and their broader effects.
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martial arrangement, could have provided a stronger model of marriage as
an intimate association expressing liberty at the time. The Court could have
focused more on marriage as a form of association where persons can be
engaged in a mutual and willful project of making important decisions
together-"shaping, expressing, or imparting values" for themselves or
others, and through those efforts, "choos[ing] the contours, sexual and
otherwise, of their personal association. '20 5 Choice is critically important to
an account of liberty inhering in intimate association, and divorce-which
itself was becoming more common at the time of Griswold-plays a role in
legitimating intimate association. As Kenneth Karst put it in an article on
intimate association, "[i]t is the choice to form and maintain an intimate
association that permits full realization of the associational values we
cherish most. '20 6 Stressing the point of choice-making, Karst continues:
To say in a given case that the sovereign must keep its hands off an
individual's associational choice is merely to reaffirm that moral
responsibility lives in the only place it can live, the individual
conscience. It is meaningless to speak of morality when there is no
choice. The freedom to choose our intimates and to govern our day-to-
day relations with them is more than an opportunity for the pleasures
of self-expression; it is the foundation for the one responsibility among
all others that most clearly defines our humanity. 20 7
Reasoning about liberty in the intimate sphere, the Court could thus have
focused further on marriage as an associative union where people exercise
important and formative decision-making together-and indeed make some
of life's most important decisions in mutual regard and consideration. 20 8
The Court could have outlined the liberty exercised in the self-governing
choices that married couples make-at times together, and at times on their
own and in consideration of one another-not only about child-rearing but
also about reproduction itself Those choices speak to how citizens plan and
order their lives, make and express commitments to one another, share
ideas, and exist as willful and connected persons.
Griswold thus inhabits a transitional space in the post-New Deal
constitutional architecture. It builds on the New Deal forms of constitutional
reasoning about association, analogizing intimate association to political
association and focusing, albeit without much elaboration, on the positive
205. Tribe, supra note 21, at 1939.
206. Karst, supra note 164, at 637 ("The full value of long-term commitment is also realizable only
when there is freedom to remain uncommitted. Not only is the freedom to reject or terminate an intimate
association valuable in its own right; it also promotes the realization of values in an intimate association
that endures.").
207. Id. at 692.
208. In an era in which marriage is, and has long been in decline, any right to intimate association
should move beyond the institutional model. See id.
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aspects of bilateral choice-making in association in their relationship to
liberty.209 It also turns to the tradition of negative liberty, pivoting to
privacy. One is aided in understanding Griswold's steps towards a
substantive due process right of intimate association, though, if one
understands the New Deal linkage of "non-political" association with
liberty and its affront to the reign of negative liberty.
C. Roe, Casey, and Negative Liberty
The Court's abortion jurisprudence, on the other hand, summoned the
image of individual rights and negative liberty, and therefore was linked to
the theory of state non-interference associated with Lochnerism. As I argue
here, as others have elsewhere, 2t° these cases are easily distinguished from
Lochner. However, in other ways, the cases are also linked to the New Deal
repudiation of Lochnerism. These cases exhibit a mixed tradition, where the
Court invokes the concepts of negative and positive liberty side-by-side, as
old and new concepts intertwined. 211
Casey, more than Roe, provided a reckoning with liberty. Roe, in which
the Court upheld a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy based on a
trimester framework, was premised on a "right to privacy, whether founded
in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty or in the Ninth
Amendment's unenumerated rights. '212 The Court therefore focused on
how "there has been recognized right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, [which] does exist under the
Constitution. 213 Privacy, the Court reminded, is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, '214 but the meaning of liberty-its substance-is far from
sight.
Casey, in which the Court affirmed the essential holding of Roe but
replaced its trimester framework with an undue burden test, brought the
Court back into exploring the meaning of liberty. Casey, though, as the
Court stresses, is most directly about individual liberty, rather than
associational liberty. 215 In reasoning about the constitutional protection of
liberty, the majority declined to "suppose that the Due Process Clause
protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were
protected against government interference by other rules of law when the
209. The Court would extend the right to possess contraception to non-marital couples shortly after,
although on equal protection grounds. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
210. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 21.
211. See also Ann Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire
Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25-42 (2015).
212. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
213. Id. at 152.
214. Id.
215. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848-852 (referring to "personal liberty" and the "liberty of the individual"
and the "right of the individual").
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. ' 216 Instead, the majority spoke of a
"realm of personal liberty" which includes the "most basic decisions about
family and parenthood. '21 7 Turning again "to personal decisions," the Court
said:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.2 18
In one sense, Roe and Casey continue a tradition of thinking about
individual rights in terms of negative liberty: realms the government ought
not to enter. This, in turn, made the move towards privacy sensible. As with
Griswold, precisely because the cases involved a woman's bodily control
and integrity, and the extent to which the government should not interfere
with it, did women's privacy come into play. However, the rejection of
Lochnerism was not a wholesale rejection of negative liberty. The premises
of Lochnerism were undermined because non-interference did not protect
liberty; just the opposite. In Roe and Casey, however, there was no social
relationship like the employer-employee relationship that might undermine
the individual freedom. Governmental non-interference strengthened the
woman's freedom. It kept with her the decision about how to control her
body, and also much of the future arc of her life plan.
However, the Court in Casey also gestured towards a New Deal-like
affirmation of positive liberty, evincing a mixed tradition. The Court's
reference to "defm[ing] one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life," syncs well with Isaiah Berlin's
description of positive liberty: "I wish to be the instrument of my own, not
of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved
by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which
affect me, as it were, from outside."2 19 Indeed, Berlin then shifts to the
consequences of having the state or "other men" make such choices, 220 just
as the Court shifts to how a woman's complex choice in making such
reproductive decisions is "too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
216. Id. at 847.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 851.
219. Isaiah Berlin, Inaugural Address Before the University of Oxford (Oct. 31, 1958), in ISAIAH
BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, IN LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 118, 131 (1969).
220. Id.
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without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role."'221 This was
because, the Court continued, "[tihe destiny of the woman must be shaped
to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her
place in society. '222 It was therefore "this dimension of personal liberty that
Roe sought to protect" 223 because liberty is related to the ways-and here
the Court drew in the relational elements-that "people have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society. 224
Second, as that quote shows, the Court reasoned about sphere linkages
and blurred the line between public and private-focusing on how
protecting a woman's individual freedom in the personal realm links to how
she organizes her life and the kinds of relationships she has both with others
and as a citizen in society. That is, as Jane Schacter puts it, "[t]o link the
ability of women to choose to terminate a pregnancy with the ability 'to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation' is to place
reproductive autonomy squarely in the realm of citizenship and social
participation.1225 It is also to think about the relationship between the social
conditions of freedom and citizenship in a distinctively New Deal manner.
The Court thus continued to mix notions of state non-interference with
assertions of positive liberty and inquiry into the social conditions of
freedom.
D. The Path to Same-Sex Marriage
The path to recognizing a right to same-sex marriage consolidated the
connection between the New Deal legacy and the post-Griswold era, linking
nearly a century of jurisprudence on freedom and association in spheres
beyond the political. The Court announced "intimate association" as a right,
just as it announced worker association as a right. Along the way, it
developed its conception of positive liberty.
The path began in Lawrence, which demonstrated the mixed traditions of
negative and positive liberty developing in the jurisprudence. Like Casey,
the Court began with negative liberty but then transitioned to a more
positive notion of liberty:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
221. Id. at 852.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 853.
224. Id. at 856.
225. Schacter, supra note 23, at 759.
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presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves
liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions.226
The Court thus began with "private places" and government non-
interference but then moved to "other spheres of our existence," noting
freedom's extension "beyond spatial bounds. '227 The very mention of
multiple spheres anticipates that the path from Griswold onward might be
more capacious than one would think otherwise. 228 And the Court's
reference to action and conduct began to bring in the concept of exercise.
The Court then pivoted towards a New Deal-like move of identifying the
exercise of freedom with association. It stated that the statutes in question
violated the Due Process Clause because they "seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
criminals. '229 It was not for the State to "define the meaning of the
relationship" and its connection to "their dignity as free persons. '230 The
Court continued that "liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. '231
Here the Court focused on the relationship and its meaning, which was to
be decided by the people themselves. It was an account of liberty based on
the "dynamics among citizens. '232 The Court thus looked at the intimate
relations within the sphere and explored how they connect to and contribute
to the self-definition that occurs when the couple defines the meaning of the
relationship. In discussing the stigma that sodomy laws can bring, the Court
found the stigma, as Schacter notes, "objectionable because it deprives gay
people of the respect they are owed in pursuing their intimate life
choices. '233 Thus, it is the case that, in keeping with the New Deal tradition,
"the version of liberty offered by [Justice] Kennedy seems to go beyond a
purely 'negative' concept of freedom to one more 'positive,' in which
people are entitled to more than a right to be left alone by government. '234
Windsor provided more mixed results. When the Supreme Court decided
the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act,235 which
226. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
227. Id.
228. See Post, supra note 25.
229. 539 U.S. at 567.
230. Id. at 567.
231. [d. at 572.
232. Schacter, supra note 23, at 749.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 750.
235. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
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provided a federal definition of marriage denying federal recognition to
same-sex couples who were married in the several states, the case was ripe
for a consolidation of substantive due process doctrine around association.
Yet, in striking down Section 3, the majority never used the words
substantive due process. At the same time, the Court called the deprivation
levied by Section 3 of DOMA one "of an essential part of the liberty
protected by the Fifth Amendment. '236 The Court also explained that
Section 3 "violates basic due process and equal protection principles. 2 37
Windsor therefore appeared to be a substantive due process case, although
its focus on "equal liberty" suggests that it provided a modern variant of
"hybrid" equal protection-substantive due process claims.23 8
At the same time, the Court avoided the pitfalls that have plagued the
doctrine, framing marriage not around the architecture of privacy, as had
Griswold, but as a "commitment to one another before [the couple's]
children, their family, their friends, and their community. '239 It concluded
that DOMA "undermines both the public and private significance of state-
sanctioned same-sex marriages," telling couples that their unions are
"unworthy of federal recognition," and thereby "demeans the couple, whose
moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects. '240 This language
therefore focused on the commitment that marriage reflects-not simply as
an act of privacy-in the social world and community, and on the choices
that the couple makes. It was both positive in its discussion of choice-
making and associational in its discussion of the union. It was also, with its
turn towards dignity, responsive to the social conditions of freedom.
However promising these moves, the lack of clarity about the doctrinal
position of the case is troubling. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, stated that the
"majority never uttered the dread words 'substantive due process,' perhaps
sensing the disrepute into which the doctrine has fallen, but that is what [its
holding] mean[s] .-241 Thus, just when the Supreme Court appeared to return
to a capacious notion of substantive due process in Lawrence, it opened
itself to the argument that it was turning away from a troubled doctrine in
Windsor. The Court's understanding of the doctrine's complicated history,
one could easily suspect, is somewhere in the mix.
Same-sex marriage offered the Court an opportunity to further clarify the
meaning of freedom in the context of association, tying the knot between
the New Deal repudiation of Lochnerism and the post-Griswold
contribution to its identification of freedom in association.
236. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. -, slip. op. at 19 (2013).
237. Id.
238. See Tribe, supra note 21, at 1898; Yoshino, supra note 2, at 749-750.
239. Id. at 20.
240. Id. at 22-23.
241. Windsor, supra note 236, at 17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In reasoning about marriage in previous cases, the Court did not have
much to say about the meaning of association. In Loving, the Court struck
down a miscegenation law on both equal protection and substantive due
process grounds. It did the latter, though, mostly in passing. The Court
concluded that the laws preventing the Lovings from procuring an
interracial marriage deprived them "of liberty without due process of law in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '242 It
continued, "The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."243 The Court did not say much more, making any explication of
liberty as it touches upon marriage an afterthought. Griswold, as I described
above, did not consider the right of the Griswolds to marry, but did describe
the marriage relationship as "a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights."244
In Obergefell v. Hodges, in which the Court found that the Due Process
Clause granted same-sex couples the right to marry, the majority explicitly
referenced association and developed a conception of it in greater detail than
other precedents had. The Court both linked marriage to a "right to personal
choice ... inherent in the concept of individual autonomy" and to intimate
association, referring to marriage's importance in "support[ing] a two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals. '245 The Court also announced a "right... to intimate
association, '246 and did not tie this right to the right of privacy, as had
Griswold. The Court's connection of individual autonomy with intimate
association provides a stronger account of choice-making and bilateralism
than the one developed in Griswold, an endeavor aided by the Court's
continued reference to individual and relational choice-making in Lawrence
and Windsor. By connecting individual autonomy and associational choice-
making the Court provides a stronger basis for protecting intimate
association as an exercise of freedom.
In one sense, then, the Court consolidated the identification of "non-
political" association with freedom. It continued the turn that the New Deal
began of opening up private spheres of life as sites of important decision-
making and anchoring liberty in exercise and association. A purely negative
conception of freedom based on limited government would not be useful
for explaining why the government should protect the ability of same-sex
couples to enter into civil marriage-that is, would not show the
relationship between governmental recognition (rather than non-
242. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 12 (1967).
243. Id.
244. 381 U.S. at 486.
245. 576 U.S. (2015), slip. op. at 13.
246. Id. at 14.
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interference) and liberty. It would also be poorly positioned for explaining
why this liberty interest is fundamental to citizens, since that question
focuses on the content of personal liberty and requires the sensitivity to the
social dimensions of freedom that the Court demonstrates.
At the same time, the opinion's analytic force became somewhat weak as
the Court turned to identifying why liberty resides in intimate association.
First, the Court mixed focus on the romantic bond aspects of marriage with
associational choice-making. The majority began with the notion that
"[c]hoices about marriage shape an individual's destiny"247-gesturing
towards a positive account of liberty-but then repeatedly referred to
marriage as an "enduring 248 or "intimate bond, ' 249 emphasizing its aspects
of spirituality,250 companionship, 251 and intimacy. 252 Drawing on the New
Deal conception, the Court could have emphasized more how marriages
exemplify a form of association where persons agree to join together to
make important decisions with mutual regard, making a commitment to
govern important aspects of their lives together, and to make life plans with,
or at least in consideration of, each other, from childbirth to childrearing, to
where and how to live, to what plans to make about the future vis-a-vis
careers, community, public life, and the like, as the Massachusetts Supreme
Court did in its decision recognizing a state and federal right to same-sex
marriage. 25 3 The Court gives an account of marriage that is in some ways
like the account in Griswold-mystic and spiritual-rather than one
focused more on equal respect and choice-making.
Second, and relatedly, the Court conceived of marriage as the cornerstone
of government.254 This conception is linked to a notion of marriage
providing societal stability and harkens to an era when private spheres were
conceived of as ordering themselves-when personal life was thought to
order naturally to achieve liberty-rather than speaking to how gender and
societal relations had transformed in important ways, and therefore in a
sphere-sensitive matter. Indeed, Griswold's most New Deal-like move,
which Obergefell consolidates, is to reason from the premises of political
association as an exercise of freedom towards an account of intimate
247. Id.
248. Id., slip. op. at 12.
249. Id., slip op. at 13.
250. Id.
251. Id., slip op. at 14.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't ofPublic Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that same-sex couples had the right to civil marriage under the federal and Massachusetts constitutions
and noting that the important decisions that married couples made together "touch[] nearly every aspect
of life and death").
254. 576 U.S. (2015), slip op. at 16.
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association as one, and not vice versa.255 The intuition that self-consciously
planning a future together and making critical choices together is an
exercise of freedom extends from political liberty, to labor organization, and
through marriage. It fits more neatly in modem American constitutional
reasoning about freedom than does the intuition that "marriage is the image
of order and peace. 2 56 And, finally, the Court's valorization of marriage,
which is one institutional form of ordering, is inapt given its hook with the
right of intimate association-a concept that does not specify the
institutional form of the association and can endure beyond marriage 257 (and
indeed has particular resonance in a world where marriage as an institutional
form is waning).258
Still, the Court's affirmation of intimate association as an exercise of the
liberty protected by the Constitution connects Obergefell to the fuller
history of the repudiation of Lochnerism. It draws a century of
constitutional argument, both in the Court and across the federal branches,
into a line of reasoning about mutual association as an exercise of freedom.
From the image of self-government, and its active notion of political liberty,
New Dealers drew out an image of economic liberty in the labor union. The
post-Griswold era would draw out the image at an even smaller unit, linking
the intimate association of the married couple with liberty in fits and starts
in Griswold, and more firmly in Obergefell. This is a history that, when
fully understood, reveals something remarkable about the arc of American
constitutional reasoning about freedom and association. It signals that
freedom inheres in more than the right to be let alone and indeed in the
important choices we make together in association in life's many domains.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judges and scholars are haunted by the ghost of Lochnerism. That
haunting speaks as much to remembering as it does to forgetting. Lawyers
have forgotten the way that the architects of the New Deal era redefined
economic liberty around worker association in a stunning affront to
Lochnerism. Remembering the constitutional history that the architects
offer, though, challenges the disjuncture posited between the "Lochner era"
and the post-Griswold era. It offers, instead, a rich, if uneven narrative
255. For a critique of how this image of marriage as the foundation of societal order relies upon
historical tropes associated with coverture, see Allison Anna Tait, The Return of Coverture, 114 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS - (2015).
256. Id., quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 68, at 309.
257. See Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6CALLF.
L. REV. CIRCUIT 126, 134 (2015) ("Obergefell does not bear the marks of feminism's second legacy-
the campaigns against discrimination based on nonmarital status.")
258. See, e.g., Andrew L. Yarrow, Falling Marriage Rates Reveal Economic Fault Lines, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2015.
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spanning over a century about freedom and association in spheres beyond
politics-moving from the labor union to the marital union.
The arc of that story, narrowing from the broadly political to the
intimately personal, suggests another historical shift, perhaps a greater one.
To return to the martial union is to recall that political economy was once
derived from household economy,259 and to see that the path of modern
American constitutionalism has been to reason instead from the political
towards the personal. Political association has become an image of the
exercise of freedom with resonance beyond its own boundaries.
259. See, e.g., I JAMES STEUART, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OECONOMY
(Andrew S. Skinner ed., 1966).
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